Reporting Requirements Under the Child Abuse Reporting Statute, A.R.S. § 13-3620

To:

The Honorable Linda Lopez
Arizona House of Representatives

Questions Presented

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 13-3620 (“the Reporting Statute”) imposes a duty on certain persons to report suspected child abuse, including “physical injury,” to governmental authorities. You have asked the following questions concerning the Reporting Statute:

1. What is the meaning of “physical injury”?
2. Does a caregiver have a duty to report a non-accidental physical injury that is a cut, bruise, or scratch?
3. Must a teacher report a non-accidental physical injury inflicted on a minor by another student, such as an injury from horseplay or a fight at school?
4. Does a parent have a duty to report a non-accidental physical injury caused by one sibling to another? 
5. Must a caregiver to children with disabilities report a non-accidental physical injury to a minor caused by another minor who lacks the cognitive ability to control his or her behavior or understand right from wrong? 
6. May a caregiver consider the statutory defenses available under A.R.S. § 13-1407 in determining whether to report the offenses defined in A.R.S. §§ 13-1404 (sexual abuse), 13-1405 (sexual conduct with a minor), or 13-1410 (child molestation)?
7. If a school employee forms a reasonable belief that a child has been abused early in the school day, does the employee satisfy the duty to “immediately” report the abuse if he or she makes a report before the end of the school day?
8. Does a caregiver’s duty to report an incident of child abuse end if he or she has a reasonable belief or knows that another caregiver has previously reported the incident?

Summary Answer

“Physical injury” is “the impairment of physical condition and includes any skin bruising, pressure sores, bleeding, failure to thrive, malnutrition, dehydration, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, injury to any internal organ or any physical condition that imperils health or welfare.”  A.R.S. § 13-3623(F).

An injury need not be serious or life threatening to trigger the reporting obligation.  All that is necessary is that the injury meet the statutory definition and that a person covered by the Reporting Statute have a reasonable belief that the infliction of the injury was non-accidental.  In addition, the Reporting Statute does not excuse reporting in situations where particular classes of persons inflict non-accidental physical injury on children, be they other minors, students, siblings, or minors who lack the cognitive ability to control their behavior.  The obligation to report may be removed if the covered person reasonably believes that facts exist that would negate the offense.

Finally, covered persons must report suspected abuse “immediately.”  This requires that the person make or cause the required report to be made without delay as soon as he or she forms a reasonable belief that the child has been abused.  Specific knowledge that the incident has been reported by another caregiver satisfies this obligation.

Background

All fifty states have child abuse reporting legislation modeled after federal guidelines.  See Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I05-007.⁽¹⁾ Arizona’s Reporting Statute, A.R.S. § 13-3620(A), provides, in part, that: 

Any person who reasonably believes that a minor is or has been the victim of physical injury, abuse, child abuse, a reportable offense or neglect that appears to have been inflicted on the minor by other than accidental means or that is not explained by the available medical history as being accidental in nature . . . shall immediately report or cause reports to be made of this information to a peace officer or to child protective services in the department of economic security, except if the report concerns a person who does not have care, custody or control of the minor, the report shall be made to a peace officer only. 

The persons upon whom the Reporting Statute imposes a duty to report (“covered persons”) are (1) “[a]ny physician, physician’s assistant, optometrist, dentist, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, behavioral health professional, nurse, psychologist, counselor or social worker who develops the reasonable belief in the course of treating a patient”; (2) “[a]ny peace officer, member of the clergy, priest or Christian science practitioner”; (3) “[t]he parent, stepparent or guardian of the minor”; (4) “[s]chool personnel or domestic violence victim advocate who develop the reasonable belief in the course of their employment”; and (5) “Any other person who has responsibility for the care or treatment of the minor.”  A.R.S. § 13-3620(A)(1)-(5). 

A covered person who violates the Reporting Statute is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor, except if the failure to report involves certain sexually related offenses, the person is guilty of a class 6 felony.   Id. § 13-3620(O).

Analysis

I. The Definition of “Physical Injury” Under the Reporting Statute. 

The Reporting Statute imposes an obligation to report whenever a covered person reasonably believes that a child has been the victim of “physical injury, abuse, child abuse, a reportable offense or neglect.”  A.R.S. § 13-3620(A).  Although the Reporting Statute itself does not define “physical injury,” each of its other triggering terms is defined with regard to statutory offenses against children.  See A.R.S. § 13-3620(P)(1)-(4). “Child abuse” is defined with reference to A.R.S. § 13-3623 (the “Criminal Abuse Statute”), which establishes the criminal offense of child abuse or vulnerable adult abuse.  “Abuse” and “neglect” take on the definitions in A.R.S. § 8-201, which trigger the State’s jurisdiction to take custody of a child and terminate the parent-child relationship. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(2), 8-800.  “Reportable offense” refers to numerous sexually-related offenses against children, many of which are incorporated into the definition of “abuse.”  See A.R.S. § 8-201(2)(a).     

In defining “abuse” and “child abuse,” the statutes referenced in the Reporting Statute each use the term “physical injury.”  The Criminal Abuse Statute applies in part to “any person who causes a child or vulnerable adult to suffer physical injury or abuse.”  A.R.S. § 13-3623(B).  Section 8-201(2) provides that “‘abuse’ means the infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement or the infliction of or allowing another person to cause serious emotional damage.”  The definition of “physical injury” in the above statutes is set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(4), which provides that:  “‘Physical injury’ means the impairment of physical condition and includes any skin bruising, pressure sores, bleeding, failure to thrive, malnutrition, dehydration, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, injury to any internal organ or any physical condition that imperils health or welfare.”⁽²⁾

The Reporting Statute’s reference to A.R.S. §§ 8-201 and 13-3623 to define “abuse” and “child abuse” ensures consistency among statutes prohibiting child abuse and the Reporting Statute, which imposes a duty on covered persons to report the same offenses.  The same purpose and logic is served by using the above-referenced definition of “physical injury.”  See State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 270 693 P.2d 921, 925 (1985) (“It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that when ‘determining the intent of the legislature, the court may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia.’”) (quoting Automatic Registering Mach. Co. v. Pima County, 36 Ariz. 367, 373-74, 285 P. 1034, 1036 (1930)); People’s Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 401, 403, 46 P.3d 412, 414 (2002) (noting that in ascertaining the meaning of an undefined term, courts “look to statutes on the same subject matter to determine legislative intent and to maintain statutory harmony”).  For these reasons, the term “physical injury” in A.R.S. § 13-3620 has the same meaning as the term “physical injury” set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(4). 

II. Covered Persons Must Report Non-Accidental Cuts, Bruises, and Scratches.

In the context of child abuse, an injury need not be serious or life threatening to constitute “physical injury.”⁽³⁾ A cut or a scratch accompanied by “bleeding” both fall within the definition of “physical injury,” as does “any skin bruising.”  See A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(4).  However, to trigger a duty to report, the physical injury must also be accompanied by the covered person’s reasonable belief that the injury derived from non-accidental conduct.  In other words, even where “physical injury” is present, the duty to report exists only where the covered person “reasonably believes” that the injury has been “inflicted on the minor by other than accidental means or that is not explained by available medical history as being accidental in nature.”  A.R.S. § 13-3620(A).⁽⁴⁾

Whether a reasonable belief triggering the reporting obligation exists necessarily depends on the circumstances, such the child’s age, vulnerability, the location and nature of the injury, the seriousness of the injury, whether the injury is isolated or repeated, previous incidents of abuse, or knowledge of extenuating circumstances. A bruise on an older child known to play football, for example, may signify nothing, whereas the same injury on an infant or a toddler may sound an alarm.

III. Teachers and School Personnel Must Report Non-Accidental Physical Injuries Inflicted on Minors By Other Students.

The policy reflected by the Reporting Statute is to protect children from abuse no matter who inflicts it.  The same policy is reflected in the Criminal Abuse Statute, which applies to “any person who causes a child . . . to suffer physical injury or abuse” where the injury was inflicted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence.  See A.R.S. § 13-3623(B).  Neither statute excludes intentional injury inflicted by minors, whether at school or elsewhere.  Minors are capable of inflicting serious physical injury or even death.  They are also capable of perpetrating other offenses listed in the Reporting Statute, including incest, sexual assault, and sexual molestation. 

Although applying the Reporting Statute to minors in the school environment sometimes may lead to difficult interpretive situations, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to exempt teachers from reporting triggering offenses, including “physical injury,” inflicted by students.  In this regard, the age of the perpetrator and the age or vulnerability of victim may be relevant factors in determining whether a reasonable belief triggering the reporting obligation exists.  See Section II, supra.  The same may be true of the circumstances in which the injury arises.  For example, a cut inflicted by an adult on a young child may be viewed differently than a minor cut inflicted during an isolated school yard tussle among 12-year-old boys.  However, labels such as “horseplay” or school yard “fights” are imprecise and cannot be used as a litmus test to dismiss the reporting obligation where the conduct fairly falls within the statute.  When in doubt, teachers and school personnel should report the offense.

IV. The Reporting Statute Does Not Exempt Parents from the Duty to Report Non-Accidental Physical Injury Caused by a Sibling. 

The Reporting Statute does not expressly or impliedly exclude physical injuries inflicted by siblings, or any other family member.  Infants and small children can be mistreated (physically, sexually, or both) by older siblings, and if not reported, such injuries may go unabated.  There is no indication that the Legislature intended to exclude sibling-inflicted injuries as triggering offenses, or to excuse parents or other covered persons from the duty to report.  Indeed, the Reporting Statute specifically imposes a reporting obligation on “the parent, stepparent or guardian of the minor” and “any other person who has responsibility for the care or treatment of the minor.”  A.R.S. § 13-3620(A)(3)&(5). 

V. The Reporting Statute Makes No Exception for Situations in Which a Non-Accidental Physical Injury to a Minor Is Caused by a Child Who Lacks the Cognitive Ability to Control His or Her Behavior. 

The statutory language does not exclude the reporting requirement for caregivers to children with disabilities where the perpetrator lacks the cognitive ability to control his or her behavior or understand right from wrong.   From the injured child’s point of view, it makes little difference whether a perpetrator has the cognitive ability to control or appreciate his conduct.  Indeed, such lack of control or understanding may make the situation more likely to recur. The primary purpose of the Reporting Statute is not to punish the wrongdoer, but is, rather, to protect the child. 

VI. Covered Persons May Take Into Consideration Statutory Defenses In Determining Whether to Report.

The Reporting Statute imposes a reporting obligation if a covered person reasonably believes that a minor has been the victim of a “reportable offense,” which encompasses several sexually-related offenses, including A.R.S. § 13-1404, sexual conduct with a minor under A.R.S. § 13-1405, and molestation of a child under A.R.S. § 13-1410.⁽⁵⁾ A.R.S. §§ 13-3620(A), -3620(P)(4).  Failure to report a “reportable offense” is a class 6 felony.  See A.R.S. § 13-3620.

Section 13-1407, A.R.S., sets forth various statutory defenses to some of the listed criminal offenses which, if found, may negate the existence of an offense.  For example, in the case of “sexual abuse” under A.R.S. § 13-1404 (which includes “intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with [a minor]”) or sexual conduct with a minor under A.R.S. § 13-1405 (“intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact”), there is a defense if done in furtherance of a lawful medical practice, A.R.S. §13-1407(A), or during the course of recognized and lawful emergency care, A.R.S. §13-1407(C), if the defendant is the spouse of the minor, A.R.S. § 13-1407(D), or if the victim’s lack of consent was based on incapacity to consent because he or she was fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age if the defendant did not know and could not have reasonably known the age of the victim, A.R.S. § 13-1407(B).   There is also a defense to sexual conduct with a minor, A.R.S. § 13-1405, if the victim is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen, the defendant is under nineteen or attending high school and is no more than twenty-four months older than the victim and the conduct is consensual, A.R.S. § 13-1407(F).    

Although the Reporting Statute does not address the effect of such statutory defenses on the duty to report, such defenses may be considered in the determination whether a “reportable offense” has occurred.  See Lowry v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 195 Ariz. 398, 400, 989 P.2d 152, 154 (1999) (noting that ambiguous statutes must be interpreted with regard to their intended purposes).  The purpose of the Reporting Statute is to protect children against “reportable offenses.”  Thus, where the facts would lead a reasonable person to conclude that no offense has been committed (i.e., where the defense negates the existence of an offense), there is no  reporting obligation.⁽⁶⁾

VII. Absent Extenuating Circumstances, a School Employee Who Reasonably Believes that a Child Has Been Abused Must Report, or Cause a Report to Be Made, Immediately.

The Reporting Statute provides that “any person who reasonably believes that a minor is or has been the victim of physical injury, abuse, child abuse, a reportable offense or neglect that appears to have been inflicted on the minor by other than accidental means . . . shall immediately report or cause reports to be made of this information .”  A.R.S. § 13-3620(A).  The Reporting Statute further provides that “reports shall be made immediately by telephone or in person and shall be followed by a written report within seventy-two hours.” Id. at § 13-3620(D).  The term “immediately” is not defined in the Reporting Statute or elsewhere in Title 13.   

In interpreting statutes, “we give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”   State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493, 799 P.2d 831, 834 (1990).   “Immediately” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary, as “without interval of time” or “in direct connection or relation.”  Webster’s New Int’l. Dict. (3d ed. 1976).  Moreover, as indicated by the Legislature’s use of the word “immediately,” in the realm of child abuse, time is often of the essence.  This sense of urgency is reinforced in subsection D of the Statute, which provides that that “reports shall be made immediately by telephone or in person and shall be followed by a written report within seventy-two hours.”⁽⁷⁾

If a school employee forms a reasonable belief early in the school day that a child has been abused, the statute would require the teacher to make a report, or cause the report to be made, as soon as possible.  If injuries are being inflicted by family members or other custodial caregivers, failure to act before the end of the school day may put the child at further risk.  By requiring immediate reporting, the statute makes it more likely that child protective services will be able to respond to the report before the end of the school day when the child is scheduled to return home.  In short, to comply with the Reporting Statute, a covered person should make the required report immediately and without delay as soon as the person forms a reasonable belief that a child has been abused. 

VIII. A Caregiver’s Obligation to Report Is Satisfied Through Specific Knowledge that the Incident Has Been Reported by Another Caregiver.

As explained in Attorney General Opinion I05-007, the Reporting Statute’s language explicitly mandates that a person subject to the statute who “reasonably believes” that abuse has occurred “‘immediately report or cause reports to be made of this information to a peace officer or to child protective services in the department of economic security.’”  Id.at 4 (quoting A.R.S. § 13-3620(A)).   A caregiver satisfies this obligation either by directly reporting the incident or ensuring that the information is conveyed to the proper authorities.  Id.  Specific knowledge that the incident has been reported by another caregiver satisfies this obligation.  Mere belief without verification is insufficient.

Conclusion

The Reporting Statute imposes a reporting obligation if a covered person reasonably believes that a minor has been the victim of “physical injury, abuse, child abuse, a reportable offense or neglect.”  In this context, “physical injury” is defined as “the impairment of physical condition and includes any skin bruising, pressure sores, bleeding, failure to thrive, malnutrition, dehydration, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, injury to any internal organ or any physical condition that imperils health or welfare.”  A.R.S. § 13-3623(F). 

The Reporting Statute does not require an injury to be serious or life threatening to trigger the reporting obligation.  All that is necessary is that the injury meet the statutory definition and that the covered person have a reasonable belief that the injury was inflicted by non-accidental means.  Nor does the Reporting Statute excuse reporting in situations where particular classes of persons inflict non-accidental physical injury on children, be they minors, other students, siblings, or minors who lack the cognitive ability to control their behavior.  In certain cases, the obligation to report may be lifted if the covered person reasonably believes that facts exist that would constitute a statutory defense and, thus, negate the offense.

Finally, the Reporting Statute is clear that covered persons must report immediately.  This requires that the covered individual make the report, or cause the required report to be made, without delay as soon as the person forms a reasonable belief that the child has been abused.  Specific knowledge that the incident has been reported by another caregiver satisfies this obligation.

Terry Goddard
Attorney General