

1 **MARK BRNOVICH**
2 **ATTORNEY GENERAL**
(Firm State Bar No. 14000)

3
4 Drew C. Ensign (CA Bar No. 243956)
5 *Deputy Solicitor General*
6 Office of the Arizona Attorney General
7 2005 N. Central Ave.
8 Phoenix, Arizona 85004
9 Telephone: (602) 542-5025
10 Facsimile: (602) 542-8083
11 Drew.Ensign@azag.gov

12 *Attorney for Amicus Arizona Attorney General's Office*

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15 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
16 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
17 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

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IN RE GOOGLE LLC STREET VIEW
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
LITIGATION

Case No.: 3:10-md-02184-CRB

STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
***AMICUS CURIAE* BRIEF URGING**
REJECTION OF PROPOSED *CY*
***PRES-ONLY* CLASS ACTION**
SETTLEMENT

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The undersigned Attorneys General are their respective States' chief law enforcement or legal officers. Their interest here arises from two responsibilities. *First*, the Attorneys General have an overarching responsibility to protect their States' consumers. *Second*, the undersigned have a responsibility to protect class members under the Class Action Fairness Act, which prescribes a role for state Attorneys General in the class action settlement approval process. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1715; *see also* S. REP. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (requirement "that notice of class action settlements be sent to appropriate state and federal officials," exists "so that they may voice concerns if they believe that the class action settlement is not in the best interest of their citizens."); *id.* at 34 ("notifying appropriate state and federal officials ... will provide a check against inequitable settlements"; "Notice will also deter collusion between class counsel and defendants to craft settlements that do not benefit the injured parties.").

This brief is a continuation of the ongoing effort of state Attorneys General to protect consumers from class action settlement abuse, an effort that has produced meaningful settlement improvements. *See, e.g., Allen v. Similasan Corp.*, No. 12-cv-376, Dkts. 219, 223, 257, 261 (S.D. Cal.) (after state Attorneys General *amicus*, court rejected initial settlement and revised deal was reached, increasing class' cash recovery from \$0 to ~\$700,000); *Cowen v. Lenny & Larry's, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-01530, Dkts. 94, 110, 117 (N.D. Ill.) (involvement of government officials, including state Attorneys General, produced revised settlement that increased class's cash recovery from \$350,000 to ~\$900,000).

The Attorneys General submit this brief to further these interests, speaking for consumers who will be harmed by the proposed settlement that has obtained a \$13 million cash fund yet sends no cash or other direct compensation to class members.¹

¹ The parties do not oppose this filing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1
2 The Court should reject the settlement because it proposes to bargain away class
3 claims on behalf of millions of consumers nationwide in exchange for no direct benefit to
4 the class, which cannot satisfy Rule 23 or the obligations the Court owes to the unnamed
5 class members. This case illustrates in stark terms the erroneous nature of *cy pres*-only
6 class action settlements; almost a decade of litigation has resulted in a deal that offers
7 nothing to the class even as Defendant Google, named plaintiffs, and class counsel walk
8 away with substantial value. The proposed settlement generates a \$13 million cash fund
9 from the release of unnamed class members' claims, but instead of sending that money to
10 class members, the parties have instead divided it between select *cy pres* recipients, class
11 counsel, and class representatives. And the purported injunctive relief mirrors relief
12 already promised by Google through a 2013 agreement with 39 state Attorneys General.

13 Put simply, in this settlement, class members, who are already at a disadvantage in
14 the class action settlement process, release their claims in exchange for nothing. Such a
15 settlement cannot be fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23. Courts at all levels
16 have debated the appropriateness of *cy pres* within class action settlements. And the
17 issue has drawn recent interest from the Supreme Court. *See Frank v. Gaos*, 138 S. Ct.
18 1697 (2018) (granting certiorari in a *cy pres*-only class action settlement case); *Marek v.*
19 *Lane*, 571 U.S. 1003 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)
20 (recognizing need to address “fundamental concerns” surrounding use of *cy pres*).

21 Whatever the contours of appropriate *cy pres* relief in a class action settlement
22 might be (if any), it cannot be that a *cy pres*-only deal like this one passes muster under
23 Rule 23. The Court has a duty to the absent class members in the present posture of this
24 case that necessitates rejecting this settlement, sending the parties back to divide the
25 settlement proceeds such that unnamed class members get a direct benefit from the
26 millions of dollars that Defendant Google has put on the table to resolve the class claims
27 in this case.

1 **ARGUMENT**

2 **I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE SETTLEMENT, WHICH PROVIDES**
 3 **NO DIRECT BENEFIT TO CLASS MEMBERS**

4 **A. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT DIVERTS ALL CASH COMPENSATION TO *CY***
 5 ***PRES* RECIPIENTS, NAMED PLAINTIFFS, AND CLASS COUNSEL**

6 The proposed settlement generates a \$13 million cash fund, but instead of sending
 7 cash compensation to the class members whose claims are being released, the settlement
 8 is structured to only pay third-party *cy pres* recipients, class counsel, and class
 9 representatives. The settlement sends ~\$8.75 million to selected *cy pres* recipients, ~\$4
 10 million to class counsel, and ~\$91 thousand to class representatives. Absent class
 11 members receive nothing from the \$13 million cash fund. Yet it is the absent class
 12 members who are being certified together into a class solely so their claims, both
 13 injunctive *and* monetary, can be bargained away in order to warrant a \$13 million pay out
 14 by Defendant Google. Those ““settlement funds are the property of the class[.]”” *In re*
 15 *BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 775 F.3d 1060, 1064 (8th Cir. 2015); *see also Klier v. Elf*
 16 *Atochem N. Am., Inc.*, 658 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ettlement-fund proceeds,
 17 having been generated by the value of the class members’ claims, belong solely to the
 18 class members.”). Unlike settlements that use *cy pres* solely to distribute leftover funds
 19 or uncashed checks after class members have received their share of the funds, this *cy*
 20 *pres*-only settlement makes no attempt to send *any* portion of the significant cash fund to
 21 the class members to whom the money properly belongs. *Cf. In re Easysaver Rewards*
 22 *Litig.*, 906 F.3d 747, 761 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing use of *cy pres* for distributing
 23 leftover or “unclaimed” funds).

24 **B. ANY PURPORTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS ILLUSORY**

25 Settlement proponents cannot rely on purported injunctive relief to explain away
 26 the failure to provide direct monetary compensation to unnamed class members here
 27 because the purported injunctive relief plainly reiterates terms that Google already agreed
 28

1 to when it entered an “Assurance of Voluntary Compliance” in 2013 with 39 state
2 attorneys general (the “AG Assurance”). *See* Dkt. 186 at 78–90. The settlement
3 proposes that Google will (1) destroy all “Acquired Payload Data”; (2) not collect and
4 store “Payload Data” without consent; (3) comply with the privacy program described in
5 the AG Assurance; and (4) maintain educational resources instructing users on encrypting
6 wireless networks and removing networks from Google’s location services. Dkt. 166-1 at
7 19–20. But these are the terms to which Google already committed itself in settling with
8 state Attorneys General. In the AG Assurance, using almost identical terms, Google
9 committed to: (1) delete or destroy all “Payload Data”; (2) not collect and store “Payload
10 Data” for use in any product or service without notice and consent; (3) maintain a privacy
11 program as set forth in the AG Assurance; and (4) implement a public service and
12 educational campaign. Dkt. 186 at 78–83.

13 There can be no question that at the time of the settlement, Google had already
14 agreed (through the AG Assurance) to the same injunctive provisions that are now
15 presented to the Court as offering independent settlement value. There is no basis for
16 treating these reiterated promises as having independent value here, especially given that
17 the promises were previously made to government enforcement entities. *See, e.g., In re*
18 *Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions*, 148 F.3d 283, 338 (3d Cir.
19 1998) (error for district court to fail “to distinguish between those benefits created by the
20 [governmental agencies] and those created by class counsel” (cited favorably by *In re*
21 *Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2011)).

22 Proponents cannot evade the reality of the injunctive relief’s overlap here by
23 pointing to the extension of certain existing promises into future years. As an initial
24 matter, the promises in the AG Assurance to delete or destroy the “Payload Data” and
25 refrain from collecting such data in the future came without an expiration date. As for
26 the privacy program and educational commitments, Google had already agreed in the AG
27 Assurance to maintain a privacy program until 2023 and create educational resources.
28

1 Proponents face a stiff burden in trying to demonstrate that class members
2 materially benefit from the settlement’s promise to extend the duration of the existing
3 privacy program and educational resources for two years. First, multiple provisions of
4 the AG Assurance Privacy Program require mere delivery of the AG Assurance to
5 management and supervisors within 30 days of its effective date. Dkt. 186 at 80. There
6 can be no material value from reiteration of these historic promises requiring delivery of
7 a document almost a decade ago. Second, multiple provisions of the AG Assurance
8 Privacy Program relate to Google’s internal practices of staying informed about privacy
9 concerns. These promises include providing regular employee training about user
10 privacy, establishing a “Privacy Week” providing programs internally on privacy, taking
11 steps to hire third-parties with capability of maintaining user privacy, creating a program
12 for responding to events of unauthorized collection or disclosure, and designating an
13 employee to conduct periodic reviews. These provisions may have been novel, material,
14 and valuable when originally entered into in 2013. But intervening years have changed
15 the privacy landscape and fundamentally altered how large technology companies, and in
16 particular Google, must approach user-privacy questions. The drumbeat of high-profile,
17 critical articles about Google’s handling of privacy and user information alone have
18 placed privacy in the technology sector at the forefront of the public discussion.² There
19 can be little doubt that now, with privacy concerns sitting front and center for consumers
20 and for Silicon Valley as a whole, Google will maintain privacy training, privacy
21 advertising, and management-level attention to questions of user privacy and identified
22

23 ² See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, *Goodbye, Chrome: Google’s Web Browser Has Become*
24 *Spy Software*, Wash. Post (June 21, 2019, 5:00 AM), [https://www.washingtonpost.com/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/21/google-chrome-has-become-surveillance-software-its-time-switch/)
25 [technology/2019/06/21/google-chrome-has-become-surveillance-software-its-time-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/21/google-chrome-has-become-surveillance-software-its-time-switch/)
26 [switch/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/21/google-chrome-has-become-surveillance-software-its-time-switch/); Ryan Nakashima, *AP Exclusive: Google Tracks Your Movements, Like It or Not*,
27 *AP News* (Aug. 13, 2018), [https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb/AP-](https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb/AP-Exclusive:-Google-tracks-your-movements,-like-it-or-not)
28 [Exclusive:-Google-tracks-your-movements,-like-it-or-not](https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb/AP-Exclusive:-Google-tracks-your-movements,-like-it-or-not).

1 instances of unauthorized collection or disclosure; proponents have certainly failed to
2 carry their burden of explaining how extension of general privacy promises made almost
3 a decade ago provide material value in the current environment.

4 Not only is the relief already in place, and likely to stay in place as a matter of
5 necessity in light of the current privacy environment, but it is also forward looking and
6 not designed to benefit class members any more than the public at large. Courts have
7 repeatedly recognized the “obvious mismatch” between injunctive relief consisting of
8 only future disclosures and a class comprised of those alleging *past* harm. *See Koby v.*
9 *ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc.*, 846 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2017); *see also Pearson v. NBTY,*
10 *Inc.*, 772 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2014) (“future purchasers are not members of the class,
11 defined as it is as consumers who have purchased [defendant’s product].”); *In re Dry*
12 *Max Pampers Litig.*, 724 F.3d 713, 720 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The fairness of the settlement
13 must be evaluated primarily based on how it *compensates class members*’—not on
14 whether it provides relief to other people[.]”). The Ninth Circuit noted in *Koby* that the
15 defendant’s promise to make certain disclosures in the future was “worthless to most
16 members of the class” because the relief was not designed to specifically benefit “those
17 who had suffered a past wrong.” 846 F.3d at 1079. The court also noted that “[b]ecause
18 the settlement gave the absent class members nothing of value, they could not fairly or
19 reasonably be required to give up anything in return.” *Id.* at 1080. Class members who
20 were harmed by the alleged wrongful conduct here receive no material value from the
21 nominal extension of resources fashioned to benefit the general public.

22 Without receiving any of the \$13 million cash fund or any meaningful injunctive
23 relief, class members receive no direct benefit from the settlement. The settlement’s
24 broad release therefore extinguishes class members’ claims in exchange for nothing.

25 **C. THIS *CY PRES*-ONLY SETTLEMENT FAILS TO COMPORT WITH THE**
26 **MANDATES OF RULE 23(e)**

27 District courts have “a fiduciary duty to look after the interests of ... absent class
28

1 members.” *Allen v. Bedolla*, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court’s
2 “inquiry is not a casual one; the uncommon risks posed by class action settlements
3 demand serious review by the district court.” *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg.,*
4 *Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 895 F.3d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 2018). This is
5 particularly true “[w]hen, as here, the settlement was negotiated before the district court
6 certified the class.” *Id.* at 610–11; *see also In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 946 (“Prior to
7 formal class certification, there is an even greater potential for a breach of fiduciary duty
8 owed the class during settlement.”). A settlement proposed before class certification
9 “must withstand an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other
10 conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required under Rule 23(e) before securing the
11 court’s approval as fair.” *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 946.

12 Given the court’s fiduciary duty to protect absent class members, as well as the
13 extensive interest that the use of *cy pres* has generated in courts across the country,
14 including from the Supreme Court, this Court should look critically at the settlement
15 here, recognize that it offers no direct compensation to unnamed class members in
16 exchange for the release of their claims, and on that basis reject the settlement as
17 insufficient under Rule 23(e), sending the parties back to craft a way to put the millions
18 of dollars here into the hands of consumers.

19 **1. Courts Have Continued To Criticize The Use Of *Cy Pres* In Class**
20 **Action Settlements, And In Particular, *Cy Pres*-Only Settlements**

21 *Cy pres* settlements “have been controversial in the courts of appeals.” *In re*
22 *BankAmerica*, 775 F.3d at 1063. “The opportunities for abuse have been repeatedly
23 noted.” *Klier*, 658 F.3d at 480 (Jones, J., concurring). And circuit judges have explained
24 that, “[w]hatever the superficial appeal of *cy pres* in the class action context may have
25 been, the reality of the practice has undermined it.” *Id.* at 481.

26 But it is not only the courts of appeals that have recognized the concerns
27 surrounding the use of *cy pres* in this context. Supreme Court Justices have weighed in
28

1 on the issue, recognizing the controversy and questions created by the importation of the
2 *cy pres* doctrine into the class action settlement context. In 2013, the Court denied
3 certiorari in *Marek v. Lane*, a *cy pres*-only settlement case arising out of the Ninth
4 Circuit. 571 U.S. 1003 (2013). But Chief Justice Roberts issued a statement along with
5 the Court’s denial noting the existence of “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of
6 [*cy pres*] remedies in class action litigation, including when, *if ever*, such relief should be
7 considered; how to assess its fairness as a general matter; ... what the respective roles of
8 the judge and parties are in shaping a *cy pres* remedy; ... and so on.” *Id.* (Roberts, C.J.,
9 statement respecting denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).

10 And in its last term, the Court granted certiorari in *Frank v. Gaos*, a Ninth Circuit
11 case with factually similar issues, challenging whether a *cy pres*-only settlement could be
12 “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Rule 23(e). 138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018). The Court
13 did not reach the merits of the *cy pres* question, ultimately vacating the Ninth Circuit’s
14 opinion and remanding to the lower courts to address a question of standing.³ But Justice
15 Thomas dissented, stating that he would have reached the merits and reversed. *Frank v.*
16 *Gaos*, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that
17 he would have held “that the class action should not have been certified, and the
18 settlement should not have been approved” because class members “received no
19 settlement fund, no meaningful injunctive relief, and no other benefit whatsoever in
20 exchange for the settlement of their claims[.]” *Id.* at 1048. He further stated that “*cy*
21 *pres* payments are not a form of relief to the absent class members and should not be
22 treated as such (including when calculating attorney’s fees).” *Id.* at 1047.

23 ////

24 ////

25
26 ³ The case is currently pending at the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
27 California. *See* No. 5:10-CV-04809.

1 **2. Cy Pres-Only Settlements Cannot Be Approved As Fair, Reasonable,**
 2 **And Adequate Under Rule 23(e) Because The Class Receives No**
 3 **Direct Benefit**

4 In its Rule 23(e) fairness determination, this Court must consider that a *cy pres*-
 5 only settlement, such as the settlement at hand, provides no direct benefit to class
 6 members. “Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is meant to provide a vehicle
 7 to compensate class members and to resolve disputes.” *In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec.*
 8 *Litig.*, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (D.N.M. 2012). And Rule 23 is to be “applied with
 9 the interests of absent class members in close view.” *Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor*,
 10 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). It is therefore critical that any class action settlement under
 11 Rule 23(b)(3) include a direct benefit to the class—otherwise, the class action being
 12 certified and judicially approved serves only to allow defendants to aggregate claims
 13 solely for purposes of extinguishing them.⁴

14 Yet *cy pres* distributions themselves do not directly benefit the class; in the place
 15 of the traditional direct benefit to the class in exchange for the extinguishment of their
 16 claims, *cy pres* deals substitute an indirect benefit. *See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*, 696
 17 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A *cy pres* remedy ... is a settlement structure wherein
 18 class members receive an indirect benefit ... rather than a direct monetary payment.”).
 19 And courts have readily noted that the “indirect benefit” received by the class from *cy*
 20 *pres* in place of direct compensation “is at best attenuated and at worse illusory.” *In re*
 21 *Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013).

22 *Cy pres*’s diversion of settlement funds away from consumers is particularly
 23 concerning because consumers already face disadvantages in the class action settlement

24 ⁴ Rule 23(b)(3) class actions present different considerations than those under (b)(1) and
 25 (b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) actions are focused specifically on “individualized monetary
 26 claims,” whereas under (b)(1) or (b)(2), “individual adjudications [are] impossible or
 27 unworkable” or “the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once.” *Wal-*
 28 *Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 361–62 (2011).

1 process. Most notably, in dividing settlement funds that are obtained via the release of
2 class members' claims, the interests of class members and others often diverge. Class
3 counsel has an incentive to obtain a large fee, causing potential conflicts with the class.
4 *See In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig.*, 716 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013). And *cy pres*
5 settlement arrangements further the existing "conflict of interest between class counsel
6 and their clients because the inclusion of a *cy pres* distribution may increase a settlement
7 fund, and with it attorneys' fees, without increasing the direct benefit to the class." *In re*
8 *Baby Prods.*, 708 F.3d at 173; *see also Lane*, 696 F.3d at 834 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting)
9 (noting the "incentive for collusion" in *cy pres* class settlements; "the larger the *cy pres*
10 award, the easier it is to justify a larger attorneys' fees award.").

11 And defendants are not incentivized to correct this conflict. "[A] defendant who
12 has settled a class action lawsuit is ultimately indifferent to how a single lump-sum
13 payment is apportioned between the plaintiff's attorney and the class." William D.
14 Henderson, *Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form of Collusion in Class Action*
15 *Settlements*, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 820 (2003). The fee and class award "represent a
16 package deal," *Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp.*, 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996),
17 with a defendant "interested only in the bottom line: how much the settlement will cost
18 him." *In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig.*, 799 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2015). Defendants
19 may actually prefer *cy pres* as opposed to direct relief to the class. *See, e.g., Lane*, 696
20 F.3d at 834 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting) ("A defendant may prefer a *cy pres* award ... for the
21 public relations benefit"); *S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.*, 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415
22 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (*cy pres* may "actually benefit[] the defendant rather than the plaintiffs,"
23 as "defendants reap goodwill from the donation of monies to a good cause"); *see also*
24 *Google and Facebook's New Tactic in the Tech Wars*, Fortune (July 30, 2012) (noting
25 existing corporate donations to many proposed *cy pres* recipients and support on cases
26 and issues those recipients often give to donating corporations).

* * *

Where a settlement generates a \$13 million cash fund and releases millions of class members claims, but benefits only third-party organizations, class counsel, and a select few members of the class, the Court should find that such a settlement is not fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). In the absence of a direct benefit to the class, a proposed *cy pres*-only settlement like this one cannot pass muster under basic conceptions of fairness, much less Rule 23's specific requirements. A tenuous, illusory benefit from a third-party distribution does not match the purposes of Rule 23, and should not be blessed as serving the interests of the class or being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny final approval to the proposed settlement.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 2020.

MARK BRNOVICH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Drew C. Ensign

Drew C. Ensign

Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Arizona Attorney General

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

602-542-5025

Drew.Ensign@azag.gov

1 **ALSO SUPPORTED BY:**

2
3 **STEVE MARSHALL**
4 Attorney General of Alabama

5 **KEVIN G. CLARKSON**
6 Attorney General of Alaska

7 **LESLIE RUTLEDGE**
8 Attorney General of Arkansas

9 **LAWRENCE G. WASDEN**
10 Attorney General of Idaho

11 **CURTIS T. HILL, JR.**
12 Attorney General of Indiana

13 **JEFF LANDRY**
14 Attorney General of Louisiana

15 **ERIC SCHMITT**
16 Attorney General of Missouri

17 **DAVE YOST**
18 Attorney General of Ohio

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of January, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California using the CM/ECF filing system. Counsel for all parties are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the CM/ECF system pursuant to the notice of electronic filing.

/s/ Drew C. Ensign
Drew C. Ensign

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