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11	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA				
12					
13	STATE OF ARIZONA, <i>ex rel.</i> KRISTIN K.	Case No.			
14	MAYES, Attorney General,	COMPLAINT			
15	Plaintiff,	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED			
16	v.				
17	REALPAGE, INC.; APARTMENT				
18	MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, LLC; AVENUE5 RESIDENTIAL, LLC; BH				
19	MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC;				
20	CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST; CROW HOLDINGS, LP; TRAMMELL CROW				
21	RESIDENTIAL COMPANY; GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P.; HSL				
22	PROPERTIES, INC.; HSL ASSET				
23	MANAGEMENT, LLC; RPM LIVING,				
	LLC; WEIDNER PROPERTY				
24	LLC; WEIDNER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC				
24 25					

	TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page		
I.	INTRODUCTION	1		
II.	THE PARTIES	10		
	A. The State of Arizona	10		
III.	<ul> <li>B. Defendants</li> <li>1. Defendant RealPage</li></ul>	11         11         12         12         12         12         12         12         12         12         12         12         13         13         13         14		
IV.	JURISDICTION AND VENUE	RISDICTION AND VENUE14		
V.	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS			
	<ul> <li>A. Before RealPage, Lessor Defendants competed with one another on price while aiming to maximize occupancy</li> <li>B. RealPage has spent 20 years perfecting its pricing algorithm</li> </ul>			
	<ul><li>that have now been widely adopted in Arizona markets and have led to higher prices</li><li>C. Lessor Defendants agreed to give RealPage access to their</li></ul>			
	<ul><li>confidential, proprietary data to set prices higher</li><li>D. Lessor Defendants have the ability to police one another's</li></ul>			
	participation in the conspiracy.			
	E. Because of this conspiracy, renters in Arizona markets have paid and are paying higher than competitive rents			
	F. "Plus Factors" provide additional evidence of a conspiracy			

1		G.	RealPage trained Lessor Defendants to hide this conspiracy from tenants and deceive consumers				
3	VI.	VI. RELEVANT MARKETS					
4		A.	The relevant product market is multifamily apartment leases				
5		B.	The relevant geographic markets are the Phoenix metropolitan				
6		D.	area and the Tucson metropolitan area				
7			<ol> <li>The Phoenix metropolitan area</li> <li>The Tucson metropolitan area</li> </ol>				
8		C.					
9		C.	Lessor Defendants have market power in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas				
10	VII.	CLA	IMS FOR RELIEF				
11	COU	NT I V	VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA UNIFORM STATE				
12	ANTITRUST ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1401 ET SEQ.)						
13	COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA CONSUMER FRAUD						
14	ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1521 <i>ET SEQ</i> .) UNFAIR ACTS OR PRACTICES						
15	COUNT III VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA CONSUMER FRAUD						
16	ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1521 ET SEQ.) MISREPRESENTATION OR						
17	CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS47						
	PRAYER FOR RELIEF						
18	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED						
19							
20							
21							
22							
23							
24							
25							
26							
	-ii-						

1 The State of Arizona (the "State") brings this public enforcement action under the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, alleging that 2 3 Defendant RealPage, Inc. and the landlords named below entered into a price-fixing agreement and unlawful information exchange in violation of the Arizona Uniform State 4 5 Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act. The State seeks an injunction requiring 6 these defendants to stop their anticompetitive practices, restitution for consumers harmed 7 by their conduct, disgorgement, and civil penalties to the full extent authorized by Arizona 8 law. I. **INTRODUCTION** 9 1. 10 Across Arizona, including in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas, 11 competitors have joined forces and agreed to "outsource daily pricing and ongoing revenue oversight" to a single company called RealPage.<sup>1</sup> The participants in this scheme— 12 landlords who own, operate, or manage multifamily apartments—acknowledge that they 13 are all "technically competitors" but RealPage helps them "work together . . . to make us 14 all more successful in our pricing[.]"<sup>2</sup> RealPage promises that by joining up, participants 15 can "continually outpace the market in good times and bad."<sup>3</sup> 16 2. "Outpace" is code for charging higher prices than what would be charged in 17 a market untainted by collusion. This is price fixing, and it is illegal. 18 19 20 21 22 <sup>1</sup> Press Release, YieldStar Offers Revenue Advisory Services to Multifamily Owners and Managers, REALPAGE, INC. (Mar. 1, 2010), available at https://www.realpage.com/news/ 23 yieldstar-offers-revenue-advisory-services-to-multifamily-owners-and-managers/. <sup>2</sup> E-Book, *PROVEN*: *B* & *C* Assets Ace the Market with RealPage: How Two Companies 24 Pushed Performance Over 3+% Above Market, REALPAGE, INC. (2019). 25 <sup>3</sup> How YieldStar can Double & Triple Revenue Performance, REALPAGE, INC., available at https://www.realpage.com/videos/vieldstar-helps-top-nmhc-companies/. 26

3. RealPage collects and shares pricing and occupancy information for many 1 multifamily apartments in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas.<sup>4</sup> It feeds this data 2 3 into a common algorithm and then tells the participating landlords what prices to charge based on all this data. And so, competitors have stopped using independent judgment to set 4 5 prices and started working together.

4. RealPage also encourages participants in this scheme to stop focusing on 6 7 occupancy and turnover and instead push for rent increases—even if that means leaving 8 some units vacant. As one operator put it, the rental industry "grew up worshiping the 9 occupancy gods" but RealPage "totally turns the industry upside down" and allows them to grow revenue above expectations while keeping more units vacant.<sup>5</sup> One lessor defendant 10 11 has acknowledged that adopting this pricing increased turnover rates by 15 percentage points—meaning tenants had to find new apartments because of these above-market price 12 increases. But as the lessor defendant's CEO observed, the "net effect" of RealPage's 13 software "pushing people out" was an additional "\$10 million in income."<sup>6</sup> 14


5. Each dot on the map below represents a multifamily apartment where 15 RealPage is collecting and sharing pricing and occupancy information in the Phoenix 16 metropolitan area:<sup>7</sup> 17

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "Multifamily apartments" are defined as buildings with five or more dwelling units where each unit is not individually owned. Excluded from this definition are affordable, military, senior, and student housing. See Section VI(A) below. 23 <sup>5</sup> *Id*.

<sup>24</sup> 6 Joe Bousquin, Revenue Revolution: Pushing Rents Becomes the Norm, Multifamily Executive (Feb. 13, 2008), available at: https://www.multifamilyexecutive.com/property-25 management/revenue-revolution-pushing-rents-becomes-the-norm o?o=0.

https://www.realpage.com/explore/main?latitude=33.48047070670475&longitude=-26 112.08554649451035&zoom=10.



7. In the Phoenix metropolitan area, 36% of households are renters.<sup>9</sup> More than
 1.7 million people live in apartments. Today, these households are spending about 76%
 more on rent than they paid in 2016. Over the past few years, the Phoenix metropolitan area
 has "led the nation in rent increases" with many residents using 50% to 100% percent of
 their income to pay rent.<sup>10</sup>

- 8. The Tucson metropolitan area, where about 37% of households rent, has also
  7 seen historic rent increases—30% in the past two years.<sup>11</sup>
- 9. One reason renters in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas are paying
  more is because RealPage has facilitated a price-fixing conspiracy among a large share of
  multifamily apartment lessors in Arizona.
- 10. On information and belief, approximately 70% of multifamily apartment units
  listed in the Phoenix metropolitan area are owned, operated, or managed by companies that
  have contracted with RealPage for "Revenue Management." On information and belief,
  more than 50% of multifamily apartment units listed in in the Tucson metropolitan area are
  owned, operated, or managed by companies that have contracted with RealPage for
  "Revenue Management."
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11. Ordinarily, competitors do not agree to share detailed, sensitive, competitive information with one another. But to join RealPage, lessors must agree to depart from

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The "Phoenix metropolitan area" refers to the Census Bureau's Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler
 MSA and includes all of Maricopa and Pinal counties. The "Tucson metropolitan area" refers to the Census Bureau's Tucson MSA and includes all of Pima County. These MSAs are, if anything, overbroad and therefore underestimate the RealPage conspiracy's market power in Arizona's metropolitan areas.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Catherine Reagor, *Why Rent is Skyrocketing in the Phoenix Metro Area*, Arizona PBS (Mar. 24, 2022), available at <u>https://azpbs.org/horizon/2022/03/why-rent-is-skyrocketing-in-the-phoenix-metro-area/</u>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Brenda Muñoz Murguia, *Once-Affordable Tucson Neighborhoods Changing as Rents Rise*, Cronkite News (July 5, 2022) (Updated Aug. 10, 2023), available at <u>https://tucson.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/once-affordable-tucson-neighborhoods-changing-as-rents-rise/article\_15a4559e-f7c6-11ec-af12-0bfb20ba29fa.html.
</u>

1 normal behavior when competing with each other and provide RealPage with their "realtime lease-transaction data." This data is non-public, "extremely targeted," and "as fine as 2 granular bits of sand."<sup>12</sup> This data includes occupancy rates, rents charged for *each unit* and 3 each floorplan, lease terms, amenities, move-in dates, and move-out dates-"literally 4 hundreds of variables," according RealPage's founder and former CEO Steve Winn.<sup>13</sup> 5

12. RealPage feeds this data into a common algorithm that sets prices for each 6 7 lease transaction for every participant. The software that performs this function is called revenue management software, or RM Software. In RealPage's own words, RM Software 8 9 allows landlords to "outsource daily pricing and ongoing revenue oversight" to RealPage.<sup>14</sup> RealPage's purpose is to "set rents" for its clients—competitors in the multifamily 10 apartment rental market.<sup>15</sup> In so doing, RealPage has said it acts "as though we own" these 11 competitor properties.<sup>16</sup> RealPage aims to push prices beyond competitive levels; in its 12 words, RealPage aims to "achieve[] revenue lift between 3% to 7%" even in economic 13 downturns.<sup>17</sup> It calls this process "Revenue Management" or "RM." The State and antitrust 14 scholars call it price fixing. 15

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13. This scheme works because landlords agree to outsource their pricing authority to RealPage—rather than competing with one another on price. As one lessor 17

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<sup>12</sup> How YieldStar Can Double & Triple Revenue Performance, REALPAGE, INC., available at https://www.realpage.com/videos/yieldstar-helps-top-nmhc-companies/. 19

- <sup>13</sup> RealPage, Inc. Q2 2020 Earnings Conference Call (July 30, 2020), available at https://seekingalpha.com/article/4363323-realpages-rp-ceo-steve-winn-on-q2-2020-results earnings-call-transcript (Q2 Earnings Call Transcript). 20
- 21 <sup>14</sup> RealPage Renewal Reporting Presentation, Medve, available at https://medve.com/ assets/airm-renewal-reporting.pdf. 22
- <sup>15</sup> Webcast, William Blaire 40th Annual Growth Stock Conference (June 11, 2020), 23 available https://ir.varonis.com/events-and-presentations/events/event-details/2020/ at William-Blair-40th-Annual-Growth-Stock-Conference/default.aspx. 24

<sup>16</sup> RealPage Renewal Reporting Presentation, *supra* note 13.

<sup>17</sup> Outperform in a Down Market, REALPAGE, INC., available at https://www.realpage. 25 com/ebooks/outperform-in-a-down-market/. 26

defendant, Camden Property Trust, put it, once RealPage's RM Software is used, there is
not much to do beyond checking the software to ensure that it is continuing to push prices
higher.<sup>18</sup> RealPage makes the process easy by allowing participating landlords to
automatically implement RealPage's prices. This feature is called "Auto Pilot" or "Rent
Syndication." RealPage tells participants to "let auto accept run."

6 14. RealPage puts significant pressure on participants to ensure they adopt
7 RealPage's prices. In so doing, RealPage makes sure landlords are adhering to the
8 agreement. In antitrust terms, this is called policing the conspiracy to make sure no one
9 cheats by lowering prices and trying to gain market share. RealPage polices the conspiracy
10 in at least four ways.

11 15. First, RealPage employs "Pricing Advisors" whose job is to "[m]onitor and 12 report on weekly rents" and meet with landlords to ensure that properties are implementing 13 RealPage's set rates. RealPage has said that its advisors provide "strategic oversight," 14 including by working "in collaboration with on-site and regional operations management" 15 for these properties. Many lessors use these pricing advisors. But if a lessor chooses not to 16 use a pricing advisor, RealPage will train a lessors' own employees to serve the same 17 function.

18 16. Second, RealPage created a disincentive structure that chills lessors'
19 employees from departing too often from RealPage's rates. If an employee seeks to adjust
20 RealPage's prices, his or her "disputes" are "escalated to the Regional Manager" at his or
21 her company. RealPage tracks the identity of the client's staff who requests a deviation.
22 RealPage tells these clients' management who is failing to comply with RealPage's set

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<sup>18</sup> *RealPage Live at NMHC: James Flick of Camden*, REALPAGE, INC., available at <u>https://</u>www.realpage.com/videos/facebook-live-nmhc-james-flick-camden/.

<sup>25</sup> 

rates—and so, departing from RealPage's set rates can get an employee fired. RealPage calls this taking "the emotion out of pricing."<sup>19</sup>

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17. Third, on information and belief, RealPage threatens to drop lessors that reject RealPage's set rates. Lessors agree that if they fail to consistently implement RealPage's 4 5 set rates, their contract with RealPage will be terminated. When disputing a RealPage price, 6 lessors agree to "objective facts, not subjective reasoning." As Jeffrey Roper, the architect 7 of RealPage, explains, "[i]f you have idiots undervaluing, it costs the whole system."<sup>20</sup> And 8 so, RealPage ensures participating lessors cannot use RealPage's rates to undercut 9 competitors—in other words, compete in the market.

Fourth, RealPage encourages participants to automatically accept RealPage's 18. 10 11 prices. Some participants use software that automatically implements RealPage's set rates. RealPage requires participants that deviate from RealPage's set rates to provide "objective 12 reasons" for doing so. 13

19. By enabling property managers and owners to outsource lease pricing 14 decisions to RealPage's RM Software, RealPage has corrupted rental markets, replacing 15 independent centers of decision-making with a single effective decision-maker: RealPage. 16 Lessors have agreed to delegate their rental price and supply decisions to RealPage. They 17 18 understand cooperation is essential to successfully raise rent prices above competitive 19 levels. And so, Lessor Defendants-which are named below-have abided by their agreement, imposing the rents set by RealPage's RM Software. It is estimated they impose 20 21 these rates more than 90% of the time.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> COVID-19: Impact on Apartment Pricing (Webcast Summary), REALPAGE, INC. 23 (Mar. 25, 2020), available at https://www.realpage.com/blog/covid-19-impact-on-apart ment-pricing-webcast-summary/ ("Impact on Apartment Pricing"). 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Heather Vogell, Rent Going Up? One Company's Algorithm Could Be Why, ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2022), available at https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-25 realpage-rent ("Vogell").

1 20. These mechanisms provide comfort and security to competitors that are participating in RealPage's agreement. RealPage boasts about its ability to increase rents 3 regardless of true market conditions, including economic downturns or an all-out recession. RealPage emphasizes to clients and prospective clients that, by working together, "there is 4 always money to be made regardless of market conditions."<sup>21</sup> 5

21. Steve Winn, former CEO of RealPage, described one client who "began 6 7 utilizing RealPage to operate at 95% [occupancy] while seeing revenue increases 3% to 8 4%—making more profit at an occupancy level that would have made management 9 uncomfortable before." And even in dire economic conditions, RealPage promises to help facilitate rent cuts that are "not nearly as deep" as the competitive market would otherwise 10 allow.<sup>22</sup> Thus, RealPage works to fix rents above competitive levels in good times but also 11 to stabilize rent prices above competitive levels during periods of low demand. That is price 12 fixing, and it is illegal. 13

14 22. RealPage created this algorithm in 2002. And it has been perfecting it ever 15 since, with more non-public data and greater participation. It has acquired competing platforms that set rent. 16

23. Beginning at a date unknown-but since at least 2016-RealPage's 17 widespread adoption has caused renters in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas-18 19 those who have rented from Lessor Defendants and their co-conspirators-to pay an overcharge on their rent. RealPage, Lessor Defendants, and their co-conspirators have 20 21 unlawfully agreed to use a centralized system—RealPage's RM Software—to inflate rents

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Tim Blackwell, Revenue Management: Proven in Any Market Cycle: See How These 24 Top Companies Outperformed During Downturns, REALPAGE, INC. E-BOOK, available at https://www.realpage.com/blog/revenue-management-proven-market-cycle-ebook/. 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Impact on Apartment Pricing, supra note 19.

on hundreds of thousands of units.<sup>23</sup> As such, renters have paid millions more for rent than they otherwise would have but for Defendants' misconduct.

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24. Last year, evictions were the second highest on record in Maricopa County, amounting to a 23% increase from 2022.<sup>24</sup> The Defendants' anticompetitive agreement has exacerbated the affordable housing crisis—and will continue to do so moving forward. Every dollar of increased rent that the cartel illegally squeezes from renters is money they would not have otherwise paid in the absence of the conspiracy.

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25. From the time Arizona became a state, our constitution has recognized that price fixers harm consumers.<sup>25</sup> The Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act prohibits 9 competitors from participating in any "contract, combination, or conspiracy . . . in restraint 10 of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce."<sup>26</sup> 11

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26. Price fixing used to take place in smoke-filled backrooms-clandestine 13 meetings with formal handshakes. But as technology has evolved, so too have methods for restraining competition. And yet, it is still illegal to for competitors to join together 14 decision-making power to raise, depress, fix, or stabilize prices—no matter the technology 15 used to effect a price-fixing agreement. 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> RealPage's revenue management software includes RealPage Revenue Management, 18 LRO, YieldStar, and AI Revenue Management. These products are called "RM Software" in this Complaint. 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Katherine Davis-Young, There were 83,236 Maricopa County evictions in 2023. That 20 nearly broke the all-time record from 2005, KJZZ, available at https://kjzz.org/content/ 1867835/there-were-83236-maricopa-county-evictions-2023-nearly-broke-all-time-21 record-2005 (Jan. 9, 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> ARIZ. CONST. art. XIV, § 15 ("Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this 22 state and no incorporated company, co-partnership or association of persons in this state shall directly or indirectly combine or make any contract . . . to fix the prices, limit the 23 production, or regulate the transportation of any product or commodity. The legislature shall enact laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties, and in the case of 24 incorporated companies, if necessary for that purpose, may, as a penalty declare a forfeiture of their franchises."). 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> A.R.S. § 44-1402.

<sup>26</sup> 

1 27. The Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act prohibits competitors from fixing 2 prices by knowingly sharing their competitive information with, and then relying on pricing 3 decisions from, a common pricing agent the competitors know analyzes information from 4 multiple competitors. The same prohibition applies whether the common pricing agent is a 5 human or a software algorithm. As the Supreme Court of the United States has said when 6 interpreting the parallel federal antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, "the machinery employed 7 by a combination for price-fixing is immaterial."<sup>27</sup>

8 28. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act further prohibits businesses from engaging
9 in "unfair act[s] or practice[s] in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise,
10 including leases of apartments."<sup>28</sup> Defendants' conspiracy constitutes both unlawful price
11 fixing under the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act and unfair acts or practices under the
12 Arizona Consumer Fraud Act.

13 29. Put simply, RealPage replaces independent competitive decision-making on
14 prices, which often leads to lower prices for tenants, with a price-fixing combination that
15 violates Arizona law and harms Arizonans.

30. The Attorney General brings this action under the Arizona Uniform State
Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act to recover restitution, disgorgement,
civil penalties, and other important injunctive relief to remedy the harms RealPage and the
Lessor Defendants have caused in Arizona.

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#### **II. THE PARTIES**

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#### A. The State of Arizona

31. The State of Arizona is represented by and through its chief legal officer, the
Arizona Attorney General, Kristin K. Mayes. A.R.S. § 41-192(A). The Attorney General is
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<sup>27</sup> United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
 <sup>28</sup> A.R.S. §§ 44-1521(5), (7); 44-1522(A).

specifically authorized to enforce the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act. A.R.S. §§ 44-1407, 44-1528, 44-1531.

- 3 B. Defendants
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#### 1. Defendant RealPage

32. Defendant RealPage, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in 5 6 Richardson, Texas. RealPage provides software and services to the residential real estate 7 industry, including the RM Software described herein. RealPage was a public company from 2010 until December 2020, when it was purchased by Chicago-based private equity 8 9 firm Thoma Bravo, L.P. in a transaction that valued RealPage at approximately \$10.2 billion.<sup>29</sup> At that time, RealPage had over 31,700 clients including each of the 10 largest 10 multifamily apartment property management companies in the United States.<sup>30</sup> Defendant 11 RealPage is registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission. 12

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#### 2. Lessor Defendant AMC

33. Defendant Apartment Management Consultants, L.L.C. ("AMC") is a Utah
limited liability corporation headquartered in Sandy, Utah. AMC is the sixth largest
apartment management company in the United States. During the relevant period, AMC
entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage RM Software products—
specifically, YieldStar—to set prices for its rental units in Arizona, including the Phoenix
and Tucson metropolitan areas. Defendant AMC is registered with the Arizona Corporation
Commission.

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Press Release, *Thoma Bravo Complete Acquisition of RealPage*, REALPAGE, INC.
 (Apr. 22, 2021), available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/news/thoma-bravo-completes-acquisition-of-realpage/</u>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> RealPage Inc., 2020 Annual Report (For 10-K) at 6 (Mar. 1, 2021), available at 
 <u>https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286225/000128622521000007/rp-</u>
 <u>20201231.htm.</u>

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3.

#### Lessor Defendant Avenue5

34. Defendant Avenue5 Residential LLC ("Avenue5") is a limited liability 2 3 company headquartered in Seattle, Washington, organized and existing under the laws of Delaware. Avenue5 is a residential apartment manager that relies on the RealPage RM 4 5 Software in its process for determining the price of rental leases in Arizona, including the 6 Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. During the relevant period, Avenue5 entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage RM Software products to set prices 7 8 for its rental units in Arizona, including the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. 9 Defendant Avenue5 is registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission.

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#### 4. Lessor Defendant BH

35. Defendant BH Management Services, LLC ("BH") is a limited liability
company headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa, organized and existing under the laws of
Iowa. During the relevant period, BH entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use
RealPage RM Software products—specifically, YieldStar—to set prices for its rental units
in Arizona, including the Phoenix metropolitan area. Defendant BH is registered with the
Arizona Corporation Commission.

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#### 5. Lessor Defendant Camden

36. Defendant Camden Property Trust ("Camden") is a real estate investment
trust headquartered in Houston, Texas, organized and existing under the laws of Texas.
During the relevant period, Camden entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use
RealPage RM Software products—YieldStar and AIRM—to set prices for its rental units
in Arizona, including the Phoenix metropolitan area. Defendant Camden is registered with
the Arizona Corporation Commission.

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6.

#### Lessor Defendant Greystar

25 37. Defendant Greystar Management Services L.P. ("Greystar") is a limited
26 partnership headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina, organized and existing under the

1 laws of Delaware. During the relevant period, Greystar entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage RM Software products—specifically, YieldStar—to set prices 3 for its rental units in Arizona, including the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. 4 Defendant Greystar is registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission.

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#### 7. **Lessor Defendant HSL**

38. Defendant HSL Properties, Inc. ("HSL Properties") is a corporation 6 7 headquartered in Tucson, organized and existing under the laws of Arizona. HSL Properties 8 is the parent company of Defendant HSL Asset Management, LLC ("HSL Asset 9 Management"), a limited liability company headquartered in Tucson, organized and 10 existing under the laws of Arizona that operates as property manager and agent for HSL 11 Properties (HSL Properties and HSL Asset Management are collectively referred to as "HSL"). During the relevant period, HSL entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to 12 13 use RealPage RM Software products—specifically, YieldStar—to set prices for its rental 14 units in Arizona, including the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Both HSL 15 Defendants are registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission.

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#### **Lessor Defendant RPM**

39. Defendant RPM Living, LLC ("RPM") is a limited liability company 17 headquartered in Austin, Texas, organized and existing under the laws of Texas. During the 18 19 relevant period, RPM entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage RM Software products-YieldStar, LRO, and AIRM-to set prices for its rental units in 20 21 Arizona, including the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Defendant RPM is 22 registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission.

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#### **Lessor Defendant Trammell Crow**

40. Defendant Crow Holdings, LP ("Crow Holdings") is a Delaware limited 24 25 partnership headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Crow Holdings is the parent company of Lessor 26 Defendant Trammell Crow Residential Company ("Crow Residential"), which itself is a

Delaware corporation headquartered in Dallas, Texas (Crow Holdings and Crow
 Residential are collectively referred to as "Trammell Crow"). During the relevant period,
 Trammell Crow entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage RM
 Software products—specifically, YieldStar—to set prices for its rental units in Arizona,
 including the Phoenix metropolitan area.

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#### 10. Lessor Defendant Weidner

41. Defendant Weidner Property Management LLC ("Weidner") is a Washington
limited liability company headquartered in Kirkland, Washington. During the relevant
period, Defendant Weidner entered a written contract, paid for, and agreed to use RealPage
RM Software products—specifically, YieldStar—to set prices for its rental units in Arizona,
including the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Defendant Weidner is registered with
the Arizona Corporation Commission.

42. Defendants AMC, Avenue5, BH, Camden, Greystar, HSL, RPM, Trammell
Crow, and Weidner are collectively called "Lessor Defendants" in this Complaint. Together
with RealPage, they are called "Defendants."

16

#### III. CO-CONSPIRATORS

43. Not all members of the conspiracy are named as defendants in this Complaint.
Other lessors who used RealPage to set prices and share confidential business information
are known co-conspirators who entered into written contracts, paid for, and agreed to use
RealPage RM Software products to set prices for multifamily apartment units in Arizona,
including in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Other co-conspirators may not be
known yet to the State. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their coconspirators whether or not named as defendants in this Complaint.

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#### **IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

44. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-123. The
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.

45. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Each Defendant (1) transacts business and/or is admitted to conduct business within Arizona; (2) maintains substantial contacts in Arizona; and (3) committed violations of Arizona statutes in whole or part within the State of Arizona. This action arises out of and relates to each Defendant's 4 5 contacts with this forum.

46. Rental price fixing has been directed at, and has had the foreseeable and 6 7 intended effect of, harming residents in Arizona. At-issue transactions occurred in the State 8 of Arizona and/or involved Arizona residents.

9 47. Each Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business within this state, and each derived substantial financial gain from doing so. These 10 11 continuous, systematic, and case-related business contacts—including the acts described herein-are such that each Defendant should reasonably have anticipated being brought 12 into this Court. 13

14 48. Each Defendant submitted itself to jurisdiction through, among other things, pervasive marketing; encouraging the use of its services; and purposefully cultivating 15 16 profitable relationships in the State of Arizona. Defendants RealPage, AMC, Avenue5, BH, 17 Camden, Greystar, HSL, RPM, Weidner also registered with the Arizona Corporation Commission. 18

49. 19 In short, each Defendant has systematically served the Arizona market 20 relating to renting multifamily apartments and has harmed residents in Arizona such that 21 there is a strong relationship among Defendants, this forum, and the litigation.

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50. Venue is appropriate pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-401(17).

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A.

### V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

### Before RealPage, Lessor Defendants competed with one another on price while aiming to maximize occupancy.

4 51. A competitive market is characterized by landlords maximizing occupancy
5 and setting independent prices based on their own observations of the market.

52. Before RealPage gained widespread adoption in the Phoenix and Tucson
metropolitan areas, Lessor Defendants acted independently to set rents. Because they have
high fixed costs, each Lessor Defendant had an incentive to maximize its occupancy. Every
day a unit was left empty, Lessor Defendants lost the opportunity to earn revenue. As a
result, Lessor Defendants offered competitive rates to try to maintain maximum occupancy
and decrease turnover. This often came in the form of reduced prices or promotional offers,
such as rental concessions.

This is described as the "heads in beds" strategy, and it drove the market
before RealPage's RM Software was widely adopted. If supply was high, market prices
would drop. Thus, in the past, Lessor Defendants had incentive to lower rents until all
available units were occupied.

17 54. As RealPage has observed, "[w]hen markets soften, the focus naturally turns
18 from rent growth to maintaining occupancy, which often leads to concessions for new leases
19 and at the sacrifice of rent growth on renewals. Softening markets—some created by new
20 supply coming online, others by changing demand levels—have led to discounted rents in
21 some major metros."<sup>31</sup> RealPage sought to change this dynamic and keep rents artificially
22 high, defying supply and demand.

23 55. After RealPage's RM Software was widely adopted, Lessor Defendants
24 shifted from the previous competitive status quo to a new strategy, facilitated by RealPage:

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<sup>31</sup> REALPAGE, INC. E-Book, *supra* note 21.

increasing prices and tolerating the lost revenue resulting from any unrented and empty
housing units. In a competitive market, this strategy would quickly fail—any units listed at
prices exceeding the market price would be undercut by competitors and thus stay empty,
and landlords would still incur fixed costs on those empty units. This would threaten
landlords' profits.

56. Now Lessor Defendants have agreed to set prices using RealPage's
coordinated algorithmic pricing. This coordination hikes prices beyond the competitive
market. To ensure that the prices RealPage sets are coordinated, Lessor Defendants have
agreed to provide RealPage with real-time access to their competitively sensitive and nonpublic data on their housing real estate leases. This data includes occupancy rates, lease
terms, prices, and more.

57. RealPage assured Lessor Defendants that no other participating members would use this data to undercut RealPage's higher prices—doing so for too long would mean losing access to RealPage. In turn, Lessor Defendants were reassured that their competitive data would be used to keep prices artificially high, leaving renters in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas with no choice but to pay what Lessor Defendants demanded. RealPage acknowledged this would help Lessor Defendants overcome their "lack of faith in the property's ability to command the rental rates generated."<sup>32</sup>

S8. RealPage's RM Software essentially granted Lessor Defendants the courage
 to charge higher prices instead of focusing on occupancy. This is reflected in RealPage's
 own marketing materials. Andrew Bowen, RealPage's Vice President of Investor Markets,
 credited the algorithm as "driving" the growth, because "[a]s a property manager, very few

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 <sup>32</sup> Gearing Up for the Apartment Revenue Management Conference, August 2013, National Apartment Association, available at <u>https://www.naahq.org/sites/default/files/naa-</u> <u>documents/publications-units/august-units-13/Gearing-For-Apartment-Revenue-</u> <u>Management-Conference-Units-Aug2013.pdf</u>.

of us would be willing to actually raise rents double digits within a single month by doing
 it manually."<sup>33</sup> But once Lessor Defendants were acting together, these double-digit rent
 increases became more common.

59. RealPage set these double-digit price increases even though doing so would
reduce occupancy—as some renters would not be able to afford the new, higher prices. As
the creator of RealPage's RM Software Jeffrey Roper told ProPublica, RealPage's software
circumvented human agents who had "way too much empathy" and hesitated to push rents
higher.<sup>34</sup>

9 60. In a competitive market, higher prices that reduce occupancy also would 10 make Lessor Defendants' management uncomfortable. And so, they would reduce prices 11 until they hit a targeted occupancy of "97% to 98%." As former RealPage CEO Steve Winn observed, "[i]nitially, it was very hard for executives to accept that they could operate at 12 94% or 96% and achieve a higher NOI by increasing rents." But with RealPage, Defendant 13 14 Lessors were able to charge higher prices and operate at a lower occupancy level that "would have made management uncomfortable before."<sup>35</sup> In one case study, RealPage told 15 a company to increase prices by up to 7%, even as occupancy decreased from near full to 16 17 95%. The inflated price increases allowed management to increase revenue despite leasing fewer units. 18

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B.

# RealPage has spent 20 years perfecting its pricing algorithms that have now been widely adopted in Arizona markets and have led to higher prices.

YieldStar software from Defendant Camden. In August and September of that year,

RealPage was founded in 1998. In 2002, RealPage acquired the original

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 $\begin{array}{c|c} 24 \\ 34 \\ Id. \end{array}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Vogell, *supra* note 20.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Q4 2017 Earnings Conference Call, REALPAGE, INC. (Feb. 27, 2018), available at
 <u>https://seekingalpha.com/article/4151484-realpages-rp-ceo-steve-winn-on-q4-2017-results-earnings-call-transcript</u>.

RealPage coordinated a series of meetings, called "executive-level revenue management summits" with competing landlords. These meetings allowed landlords to provide "input" into the pricing system that was then "factored into subsequent releases of the product." At these summits, competitors met to discuss "methods for establishing a forecast of weekly supply," "methods to price units in real time," and "methods to manage concessions . . . that gross up net effective base rents computed by the pricing engine."<sup>36</sup>

- 62. In 2004, RealPage hired Jeffery Roper to become its "principal scientist" and
  improve the software.<sup>37</sup> Roper, who had previously worked on airline price-setting software
  that the Department of Justice alleged artificially inflated airfares by more than a billion
  dollars, began building a "data warehouse" that pulled in client data from other RealPage
  applications and output prices for participants.
- 63. From 2006 to 2016, the use of revenue management for pricing grew
  significantly, and RealPage was a key part of that growth.<sup>38</sup> In 2016, RealPage was
  reporting double-digit growth largely driven by YieldStar. RealPage became the primary
  price-setting vendor to the multifamily market through acquisitions of its competitors.
  RealPage began buying up similar and competing software companies, and it has completed
  44 acquisitions since its founding.
- 18 64. The exact date when RealPage began to dominate the Phoenix and Tucson
  19 metropolitan areas is currently unknown. But by 2016, RealPage had been adopted by most
  20 Lessor Defendants and was being used widely in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan
  21 areas.
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- $^{37}$  Vogell, *supra* note 20.
- <sup>38</sup> Press Release, *RealPage Acquires YieldStar Multifamily Revenue Management System*,
   REALPAGE, INC. (July 19, 2002), available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/news/realpage-acquires-yieldstar-multifamily-revenue-management-system/</u>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Press Release, *RealPage Acquires YieldStar Multifamily Revenue Management System*, REALPAGE, INC. (July 19, 2002), available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/news/realpage-acquires-yieldstar-multifamily-revenue-management-system/</u>.

65. In 2017, RealPage acquired its competitor Rainmaker LRO. The acquisition included LRO's revenue-management software. At the time of the merger, RealPage's RM Software was pricing 1.5 million units. That number doubled with the acquisition. RealPage then merged LRO into its existing revenue management software.

5 66. Between 2018 and 2020, RealPage continued to market both YieldStar and 6 LRO, noting that RealPage's RM products used an "unmatched database" reflecting "lease 7 transaction data on over 12M units."

RealPage has since integrated both YieldStar and LRO to "form the industry's 8 67. most comprehensive suite of solutions for precision data analytics and asset optimization 9 for rental housing assets,"<sup>39</sup> introduced as "AI Revenue Management" ("AIRM") in 2020.<sup>40</sup> 10 11 AIRM's core functionality and purpose remain identical to YieldStar's and LRO's.

68. RealPage markets AIRM as a tool that helps lessors "continuously maximize 12 13 asset value with precision pricing capabilities." RealPage describes this software as "the industry's only price optimization solution" and states that it will "maximize rents" and 14 "outperform[] the market 2%-5%."<sup>41</sup> Built upon the bedrock of its legacy products, LRO 15 and YieldStar, "[t]he backbone of AIRM is data collected from six million lease 16 transactions across the United States." 17

69. The three RealPage revenue managements products—YieldStar, LRO, and 18 19 AIRM—are functionally identical. They each automate pricing of multifamily apartment units using algorithms fueled by RealPage's vast data repositories, which are shared among 20

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> RealPage Closes Acquisition of Lease Rent Options, LRO<sup>®</sup>, BUSINESS WIRE (Dec. 4, 2017), available at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171204006136/en/ 23 RealPage-Closes-Acquisition-of-Lease-Rent-Options-LRO5C2%AE.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Guy Leman, Don't Miss This! Unveiling of "AIRM" AI Revenue Management at 24 RealWorld, RealPage Blog (Sept. 8, 2020), available at https://www.realpage.com/blog/ 25 dont-miss-this-unveiling-of-airm-ai-revenue-management-at-realworld/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> RealPage AI Revenue Management, REALPAGE, INC., available at https://www. 26 realpage.com/asset-optimization/revenue-management/.

the three products. RealPage's RM Software allows clients to "[o]ptimize rents to achieve the overall highest yield, or combination of rent and occupancy, at each property." Stated simply, these products employ statistical models that use data—including proprietary, nonpublic data—to generate a "price" to charge for renting those units. These higher prices ensure that participants will beat the competitive market.

70. RealPage contracts with property managers and owners to provide its revenue
management software. In some instances, the property manager and owner are the same
entity. Each of the Lessor Defendants in this case contracted with RealPage and materially
advanced the anticompetitive agreements by agreeing to provide competitive data to
RealPage and, in exchange, price units using RealPage's set prices.

11 71. Each of the Lessor Defendants has used one or more of the RealPage RM
12 products to set the prices of multifamily apartment leases in the Phoenix and Tucson
13 metropolitan areas. The Lessor Defendants that have used YieldStar include at least: AMC,
14 Avenue5, BH, Camden, Greystar, HSL, RPM Living, Trammell Crow, and Weidner. The
15 Lessor Defendants that have used AIRM include at least: Camden, Greystar, and RPM
16 Living. The Lessor Defendants that have used LRO include at least Greystar and RPM
17 Living.

72. While access to the RealPage RM Software is typically purchased on a perbuilding basis, RealPage charges the landlord an initial setup fee for the RealPage RM
Software and then a monthly fee for each unit. This has been incredibly lucrative for
RealPage, which has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue as a result. Each new
participant means access to more proprietary data, more market share, and more confidence
that RealPage's higher-than-market prices can dominate.

RealPage sets the prices for Lessor Defendants using its revenue management
algorithms. Lessor Defendants agree that they will not depart from these rates. As a result,

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the rates are accepted more than 80% of the time. This has allowed Lessor Defendants to "outperform the market by 2%-7% year over year."<sup>42</sup>

74. Much like the airlines' price-fixing cartel, Defendants' cartel eliminates price competition and the "race to the bottom" during periods of oversupply. As Defendant RealPage declared to both its existing and potential clients in a 2020 advertisement e-book: "You don't have to sacrifice rent growth during a softening market . . . you shouldn't lose sight of this of this proven fact: There is always money to be made regardless of market conditions."

9 75. On information and belief, about 70% of multifamily apartment units in the
10 Phoenix metropolitan area are owned or managed by companies that have contracted with
11 RealPage for Revenue Management, and about 50% of multifamily apartment units in
12 Tucson are owned or managed by companies that have contracted with RealPage for
13 Revenue Management. Lessor Defendants include some of the largest providers of
14 multifamily apartment rentals in the nation and in Arizona.

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# C. Lessor Defendants agreed to give RealPage access to their confidential, proprietary data to set prices higher.

17 76. RealPage required that Lessor Defendants contribute their non-public,
18 competitively sensitive data to RealPage's data pool. To access the price-setting tool that
19 promised revenue growth even in a down market, each Lessor Defendant agreed to
20 participate in the data co-operative and price its multifamily apartment rental units
21 according to RealPage's revenue management software. RealPage promised Lessor
22 Defendants this software would help them all "outperform the market."<sup>43</sup> As one participant

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Introducing AI Revenue Management: Next-Generation Price Optimization That Unlocks Hidden Yield, REALPAGE, INC. (2020).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> YieldStar Predicts Market Impact Down to Unit Type and Street Location, REALPAGE,
 INC., available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/videos/yieldstar-data-scientists-help-manage-supply-demand/</u>.

noted, RealPage was valuable because it provided "[c]ompetitor insight." RealPage
 explains that it "calculates exactly what you should pay on that particular day, based on . . .
 competitor pricing."<sup>44</sup>

The stated goal of RealPage on the
understanding that their competitors were doing the same. The stated goal of RealPage's
RM Software is for its clients to "outperform the market [by] 3% to 7%."<sup>45</sup> And so, the
inevitable outcome of coordinating prices is that rents have been pushed above competitive
levels.

9 78. Defendant RealPage and its clients admit the impact that the use of
10 RealPage's RM Software has on multifamily apartment rental prices. After praising a 14%
11 increase in average rental prices across 2021 at an industry event, RealPage's Vice President
12 Jay Parsons asked Andrew Bowen, RealPage's then Vice President of Investor Markets,
13 what role he thought RealPage had played in the unprecedented increase. "I think it's
14 driving it, quite honestly," Bowen replied.<sup>46</sup>

15 79. In a promotional video posted on RealPage's website, a representative from
16 Defendant BH explained that, while in a competitive market "there's a tendency . . . to let
17 your competitors drive your pricing," RealPage's RM Software price-setting function
18 "keeps you from subjectively adjusting to what the market is doing."<sup>47</sup> Defendant BH's
19 Vice President of Business Intelligence Systems, Brandy Daniel, echoed this sentiment in
20 a webcast hosted by RealPage in which BH participated.

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 $\begin{array}{c|c} 24 \\ & 4^6 Id. \end{array}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Vogell, *supra* note 20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> *Id*.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Tim Blackwell, *Six Ways Revenue Management Software Benefits B and C Properties*, REALPAGE, INC. (June 12, 2019), available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/blog/six-ways-</u>revenue-management-software-benefits-b-c-properties/.

1 80. When asked how revenue management has allowed BH to "stay ahead of the 2 market and avoid any sort of reactionary behaviors," Ms. Daniel responded that, for BH, 3 "being able to see [competitors'] transaction-level data has been really important to keeping 4 decisions in line for each market. Our very first goal that we came out with immediately out 5 of the gate is that we will not be the reason any particular submarket takes a rate dive. So 6 for us our strategy was to hold steady and to keep an eye on the communities around us and 7 our competitors."<sup>48</sup>

8 81. In other words, despite the presence of market conditions that may warrant 9 rental price adjustments in certain markets in order to attract potential renters and/or retain 10 existing tenants, if the RM Software system showed competitors were remaining steady 11 with their rental prices in those, and perhaps other, markets, Defendant BH committed to 12 pricing its own units according to its competitors' pricing rather than true market conditions 13 so as not to be the cause of any rental rate dips.

14 82. RealPage and Lessor Defendants use this edge to dominate the multifamily
15 apartment rental markets in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. RealPage's
16 dominant market position stems from this unrivaled access to very detailed proprietary data.
17 This data is then used daily to generate rental prices for each unit using RM Software.
18 Lessor Defendants eliminated competition by agreeing to outsource pricing and supply
19 decisions to each other.

- 83. RealPage and the Lessor Defendants have unlawfully agreed to forgo
  competition in favor of using a central entity—the RealPage RM Software—to set
  apartment rents. Their agreement is reflected in existing documents, has been publicly
  acknowledged by cartel members, and is closely policed to ensure compliance.
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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Smart Solutions: How to Outperform in a Changing Market, REALPAGE VIDEOS (May 4, 2020), available at <u>https://www.realpage.com/webcasts/smart-solutions-outperform-changing-market/</u> ("Smart Solutions: How to Outperform in a Changing Market").

84. Ordinarily, Lessor Defendants would compete with one another for customers (tenants) in the rental housing market, including competing on the price of rental leases to increase occupancy. Prospective tenants in multifamily apartment housing units routinely consider multiple options when evaluating potential leases, and their decisions of which unit to lease are determined in large part by the rent offered.

6 85. The RealPage scheme represents a fundamental departure from the 7 traditional, competitive marketplace that historically existed for multifamily apartment 8 rentals. RealPage and its clients have transformed a competitive marketplace into one in 9 which competing landlords work together for their collective benefit at the expense of 10 renters.

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86. This scheme worked because Lessor Defendants agreed to delegate their rentsetting authority to RealPage, which enforced compliance.

87. RealPage documents show the methods by which the company suppresses Lessor Defendants' independent price decision-making while also securing their cooperation in the cartel. RealPage training documents state: "You should be compliant" *i.e.*, each individually participating landlord must impose the rents generated by the RealPage RM Software—"90+% of the time to see the best results in your revenue management." This principle is reinforced during in-person trainings when landlords join the cartel.

88. RealPage documents are replete with references to the need for "discipline"— *i.e.*, adherence to the prices generated by RealPage. For example, an LRO training
presentation emphasizes the importance of "disciplined . . . pricing practices portfolio
wide." Similarly, an AIRM training presentation references Lessor Defendants'
commitment to the "disciplined use of formal quotes." When training landlords on LRO's
Lease Audit Report, RealPage instructs landlords: "We should have all compliant leases.
Just use the LRO price and you won't have to worry about it."

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89. Deviations from the RealPage-generated rent are referred to as "overrides."
 Consistent with their agreement to impose rents generated by RealPage RM Software nearly
 all the time, Defendants agreed to limit overrides. For example, a RealPage LRO training
 document states: "Overrides should be few and far between." Similarly, internal RealPage
 LRO training documents teach cartel members' regional managers to beware of "Override
 Overload" or "rogue" leasing agents who too frequently override the LRO-generated
 pricing.

90. RealPage facilitates landlords' compliance with the agreement in many ways,
including through a software feature that automatically accepts rents generated by the RM
Software. In both AIRM and YieldStar, this feature is called "Auto Pilot" and, if enabled,
causes the RealPage-generated rents to be automatically "accepted" and deployed to the
landlord's property management system. LRO offers a similar feature referred to as "Rent
Syndication," which automatically sends LRO pricing information to Internet Listing
Services where the landlord's units are marketed.

15 91. RealPage's message to Lessor Defendants (RealPage's clients) is that they
16 should "let auto accept run" such that the landlords "accept all" of RealPage's prices. A
17 RealPage presentation on pushing landlords to enable auto-accept states: "Not an ask of the
18 client. This is a command to the client. It isn't an optional process."

19 92. Even where Lessor Defendants do not enable auto-accept, most landlords
20 cannot, on their own, charge rents other than those generated by RealPage's RM Software—
21 landlords can only "propose an override." The landlord must then provide a written business
22 justification for why it wishes to depart from the RealPage-generated rent. The landlord is
23 also required to "enter the floorplan rent that [the landlord] is recommending" for the
24 prospective tenant in order to "submit an override recommendation."

25 93. RealPage actively polices Lessor Defendants' compliance to ensure overrides
26 remain rare. When a new landlord joins Defendants' rent-setting cartel, RealPage conducts

"secret shops" to "confirm successful adoption" of the software. This process tests whether the landlords' employees are, in fact, offering only RealPage-generated rents even in the event that a prospective tenant attempts to negotiate.

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94. RealPage has also designed its RM Software to ensure that landlords monitor 4 5 their own compliance—*i.e.*, whether the landlord has imposed the RealPage-generated rent. 6 For example, AIRM's New Lease Workflow displays a "Lease Compliance" number where 7 "100% means no compliance variances." YieldStar displays a "Lease Compliance" widget 8 to landlords that indicates whether compliance rates are acceptable and generates 9 "Compliance Reports" for landlords that present noncompliant rents as losses (in parentheses). Similarly, LRO presents a "Rent Comparison Graph" to landlords that 10 11 presents compliance data and generates "Lease Audit Reports" identifying any differences between RealPage-generated rents and the rents that the landlord in fact is charging tenants. 12

13 95. RealPage also employs pricing advisors who create reports analyzing clients' 14 compliance rates. Pricing advisors generate "Rate Acceptance and Lease Compliance Analysis" reports that measure landlords' compliance and "identify detached potentially 15 at-risk clients, properties that need additional training, or opportunities for parameter and 16 strategy alignment." In other words, RealPage monitors the prices actually imposed by 17 18 cartel members to identify anyone departing from the agreed-upon pricing plan, in order to 19 discipline that member into adhering to the RealPage-generated prices.

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96. To prevent their staff from exercising independent judgment when setting 21 rents, Defendants have established a rigorous monitoring and compliance system to ensure 22 cartel members adhere to RealPage's RM Software pricing.

97. RealPage has also ensured that there is an incentive structure that chills Lessor 23 24 Defendants' employees from departing from RealPage's rates. If an employee seeks to 25 adjust RealPage's prices, his or her "disputes" are "escalated to the Regional Manager" at 26 his or her company and he or she can be threatened with being fired. RealPage generates reports for lessors' management and executives that identify employees who fail to comply
 with RealPage's set rates—employees must accept the rates or lose their jobs. When
 disputing a RealPage price, lessors agree to "objective facts, not subjective reasoning."
 RealPage calls this taking "the emotion out of pricing."<sup>49</sup>

98. RealPage threatens to drop lessors who reject RealPage's set rates. Lessors
agree that if they fail to consistently implement RealPage's set rates, their contract with
RealPage will be terminated. As Jeffrey Roper, the architect of RealPage, explains, "[i]f
you have idiots undervaluing, it costs the whole system."<sup>50</sup> Thus, RealPage ensures
participating lessors cannot use RealPage's rates to undercut competitors—in other words,
compete in the market.

- 99. At bottom, the rents RealPage generates are not recommendations. Rather
  than competing on price, Lessor Defendants agree to and do impose the RealPage-generated
  rents nearly all the time.
  - D. Lessor Defendants have the ability to police one another's participation in the conspiracy.

16 100. Lessor Defendants have the ability to police each other's adherence to the
17 conspiracy. RealPage provides Lessor Defendants with a "peer list" of the companies whose
18 transaction data is used as an input in the RealPage pricing algorithm for that client's
19 pricing. Lessor Defendants can review their peer lists and even request that specific
20 competitors be included. In this way, Lessor Defendants know who is participating and
21 pricing off of RealPage.

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<sup>50</sup> Vogell, *supra* note 20.

<sup>49</sup> Impact on Apartment Pricing, supra note 19.


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1 101. Lessor Defendants also know who is participating based on public statements and signaling. Many participants, including Defendants Camden, BH, HSL, Greystar, and 2 3 Weidner have provided RealPage with testimonials lauding the benefits of this software. RealPage urges its clients to "shop your competitors over the phone, 4 102. in-person, and view their websites."51 In this way, Lessor Defendants have the ability to 5 6 police each other to make sure that nobody uses the information to gain a competitive 7 advantage to undercut prices and lure away customers. 8 103. This gives Lessor Defendants confidence to raise rates. As one Camden 9 executive confirmed: "[T]he public companies where we compete with them, they make— 10 we all make the market better. I mean they all use revenue management. They are all smart. 11 They raised rents when they should."<sup>52</sup> 12 E. Because of this conspiracy, renters in Arizona markets have paid and are paying higher than competitive rents. 13 14 104. RealPage's RM Software is widely used throughout the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Consistent with this, test-run economic analyses confirm that collective 15 16 usage of RealPage's Revenue Management Software leads to higher prices. Because not all RealPage subscribers are known, these preliminary results are conservative and may 17 undermeasure the true overcharge. 18 19 105. In the first analysis, public rent data was collected from the Phoenix metropolitan area. 20 21 106. The regression analysis controlled for various property and geographic 22 features such as size of the unit and number of bathrooms. Across over 30,000 units, the regression found an average overcharge of 12% on units priced by RealPage's Revenue 23 24 <sup>51</sup> Revenue Management, Overcoming Objections Guide, RealPage, Inc. (2021).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Q2 2021 Earnings Conference Call, CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST (Jul. 30, 2021),
 available at <u>https://seekingalpha.com/article/4443346-camden-property-trust-cpt-ceo-ric-campo-on-q2-2021-results-earnings-call-transcript</u>.

Management Software as compared to units not priced using RealPage's Revenue Management Software, including 1-bedroom, 2-bedroom, 3-bedroom, and studio apartments. These estimates are conservative and may underestimate the true overcharge, as not every property using RealPage is included in the estimate.

Average Rent by Conspirator/RealPage User and Non-conspirator/Benchmark



17 107. In the second analysis, public rent data was collected from the Tucson18 metropolitan area.

19 108. The regression analysis controlled for various property and geographic
20 features such as size of the unit and number of bathrooms. Across over 3,740 units, the
21 regression found an average overcharge of 13% on units priced by RealPage's Revenue
22 Management Software as compared to units not priced using RealPage's Revenue
23 Management Software, including 1-bedroom, 2-bedroom, 3-bedroom, and studio
24 apartments. These estimates are conservative and may underestimate the true overcharge,
25 as not every property using RealPage is included in the estimate.


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#### "Plus Factors" provide additional evidence of a conspiracy.

14 The market for the sale of multifamily apartment real estate leases from 109. 15 Lessor Defendants in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas is characterized by 16 numerous "plus factors" that render the industry susceptible to collusion such that the 17 formation, maintenance, and efficacy of a cartel is more likely. These include (1) high 18 barriers to entry, (2) high switching costs, (3) inelastic consumer demand, (4) market 19 concentration, (5) relative fungibility of residential real estate leases, (6) exchanges of 20 competitively sensitive information among horizontal competitors, and (7) numerous 21 opportunities to collude at trade associations and RealPage functions.

110. First, property owners and operators face significant entry barriers. These
include the high cost of acquiring property and establishing a property management
infrastructure and the ongoing costs of building maintenance and regulatory compliance.
Even small rental properties cost millions of dollars to acquire. Large properties, such as
those operated by Defendant Greystar, run into the hundreds of millions of dollars to own

1 and manage and take several years and significant experience to build or acquire. Thus, new entrants into the multifamily real estate leasing market are unlikely to discipline cartel pricing.

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Second, switching costs for renters prevent effective price competition in the 111. 4 5 multifamily apartment rental market. Residents in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan 6 areas are forced to absorb inflated rents each lease cycle owing to the costs associated with 7 moving, the time and labor required to locate a new and more affordable apartment, 8 including in-person research, background-checks, and the disruption to family, work, and 9 personal life caused by moving. And the cost of physically moving all of one's possessions 10 from one apartment to another can easily add up to thousands of dollars. Indeed, RealPage 11 itself has recognized the direct connection between the high cost of moving and landlords' ability to extract supra-competitive rents: in a training on "overcoming renewal objections," 12 13 RealPage instructs landlords to remind the tenants of the high cost of moving to force 14 acceptance of the RealPage-generated price.

15 Additionally, renters who seek to switch to a better-priced alternative mid-112. lease will likely face significant financial penalties—including forfeiture of a security 16 17 deposit that is typically at least one month's rent. Because of these high switching costs and lack of substitutability, renters in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas cannot readily 18 19 switch from one rental unit to another in the event their current rental unit no longer aligns with market prices. Making matters worse, Lessor Defendants operate most of the 20 21 multifamily apartments in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas, which significantly 22 decreases the likelihood of renters even being able to find lower-priced options in reasonable proximity. 23

Third, the demand for multifamily apartment leases is highly inelastic. 24 113. 25 Housing is a human necessity and therefore residents' demand for housing does not change 26 dramatically in response to pricing increases or decreases. Lessor Defendants are thus essentially guaranteed a reliable and steady supply of customers. Because the demand for
 multifamily housing is relatively insensitive to changes in price, it is more susceptible to
 collusion and price fixing.

114. Fourth, the market for the sale of multifamily apartment leases in the Phoenix
and Tucson metropolitan areas is highly concentrated. A relatively small number of large
property owners and management companies (many of them Lessor Defendants), control a
significant number of the multifamily rental housing properties in the Phoenix metropolitan
area and the Tucson metropolitan area.

9 The market for multifamily revenue management is even more concentrated. 115. Although Defendant RealPage has publicly stated that it collects data on over 16 million 10 11 units, its 2020 10-K filing indicates that RealPage clients in fact control 19.7 million, out of a total 22 million, investment-grade units in the country. In other words, RealPage's 12 clients comprise nearly 90% of the U.S. market for multifamily apartments. This reflects a 13 14 national trend: the number of apartments controlled by the country's 50 largest property 15 managers has grown every year for 14 years, according to the National Multifamily Housing Council.<sup>53</sup> 16

17 116. Fifth, multifamily apartments are relatively fungible, particularly within
18 classes of properties. That is, when controlling for certain high-level characteristics of
19 properties—such as the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, amenities, location, or the age
20 of the building—properties within those classes are relatively fungible. Lessor Defendants
21 recognize this fungibility within classes of properties and categorize their properties into
22 grades within the RealPage system.

23 117. Sixth, RealPage's participating Lessor Defendants, directly and using
24 RealPage as a conduit, share competitively sensitive information with one another.
25

26  $5^3$  Vogell, *supra* note 20.

1 RealPage founder and former CEO Steve Winn has noted in earnings calls that RealPage's numbers "give a much more accurate view of what's happening in the market compared to 2 merely looking at rents reported by Internet listing services or other sources."<sup>54</sup> It is even 3 less likely that this function could be recreated using any public, non-competitively 4 5 sensitive sources because the advertised rates for multifamily apartment leases can diverge 6 from the actual rates. Furthermore, RealPage provides specific, non-public pricing 7 information on important factors such as concessions that are given at the time of lease that 8 are individually negotiated and not otherwise publicly available.

9 118. Seventh, RealPage and participating Lessor Defendants have ample
10 opportunities to collude.

11 119. RealPage operates a private RealPage User Group Forum, an association of
over a thousand users, including Lessor Defendants, which, according to RealPage, aims
"to improve communications between RealPage and the user community," while
"promot[ing] communication between users" themselves. Within that Forum is an "Idea
Exchange," where Lessor Defendants submit their own ideas for changes or improvements
to RealPage's offerings, as well as provide comments on proposed changes that RealPage
is considering making to its software offerings.<sup>55</sup>

18 120. RealPage also encourages clients to serve on subcommittees, which require
19 that clients "[a]ttend one annual meeting to be held during the RealWorld conference" and
20 "[p]articipate in one conference call per quarter."<sup>56</sup>

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121. RealPage hosts in-person, annual, multi-day RealWorld summits. The summits gather Lessor Defendants with RealPage executives to network, exchange insights

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<sup>54</sup> 2020 Q2 Earnings Call Transcript, *supra* note 13.

 <sup>24 &</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> User Group Overview, REALPAGE, INC., available at <u>https://web.archive.org/web/</u>
 25 <u>20220128195118/https://www.realpage.com/user-group/overview/</u>.

<sup>26 &</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> *Membership*, REALPAGE, INC., available at <u>https://web.archive.org/web/20220128</u> <u>185904/https://www.realpage.com/user-group/membership/</u>.

1 and ideas, and discuss revenue management tools. Over the past five years, those conferences have been held in Las Vegas, Nevada, Nashville, Tennessee, Orlando, Florida, 3 and virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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RealPage advisors also have regular contact with Lessor Defendants to keep 122. 5 them up to date on their competitors. Advisors help Lessor Defendants "[r]eview pricing 6 daily or weekly in collaboration with on-site and regional operations management," 7 "[m]onitor and report on weekly rents, occupancy, and revenue trends," and "[a]djust configurations and pricing to align with your asset objectives as market conditions and 8 business strategies change."57 In an earnings call, RealPage CFO Tom Ernst stated that 9 RealPage was "actively ramping" efforts to have RealPage's sales team discuss its revenue 10 management products with its clients.58 11

123. In addition to these plus factors, RealPage also trained Lessor Defendants 12 how to avoid detection for this conspiracy. RealPage created training materials for Lessor 13 Defendants that encouraged them to avoid mentioning RM and instead lie and say units 14 were being "priced individually." RealPage encouraged concealment to avoid detection. 15

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#### G. RealPage trained Lessor Defendants to hide this conspiracy from tenants and deceive consumers.

Lessor Defendants actively concealed these material facts from consumers. 18 124. 19 Because there was no public list of RealPage participants, consumers had no way of seeing the market power RealPage wielded over Arizona renters. 20

- 21 125. There is no public list of RealPage participants. RealPage would never 22 publish such a list. RealPage's pricing algorithms are also not available to the public—to 23
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> RealPage AI Revenue Management, REALPAGE, INC., available at <u>https://web</u>.archive.org/web/20220923051511/https://www.realpage.com/asset-optimization/revenue-57 25 management.

<sup>26</sup> <sup>58</sup> 2020 Q2 Earnings Call Transcript, *supra* note 13.

participate, a company must own property such that it can set rents and agree to providedata to its competitors also participating in the conspiracy.

126. Lessor Defendants and RealPage concealed this conspiracy from the public and deceived consumers into thinking they were being charged competitive rates. RealPage provided trainings to Lessor Defendants and instructed them not to mention RealPage or pricing algorithms when explaining rent increases to tenants. Instead, Lessor Defendants were taught by RealPage to lie and say units were being "priced individually" and that concessions were "built into our prices." In reality, prices were set by RealPage and RealPage made the pricing determinations:

Scenario 2 10 11 12 "We use AI Revenue Management to price our apartments, so we don't offer specials." 13 14 "Our prices are so low we don't need to offer specials." 15 16 "Our specials are built into our prices. We price each apartment individually and we also take market conditions 17 into consideration. 18 Listen to the scenario, then read each of the three possible responses. Select the box that gives the best response for the business situation. 19

20 127. Lessor Defendants deceived consumers into believing their pricing was
21 independent and competitive. In reality, Lessor Defendants had centralized their decision22 making authority in RealPage.

128. Arizona residents have been harmed by Defendants' deception. Through
willfully deceptive practices and by omitting material facts, Defendants tricked tenants into
paying more for rent than they otherwise would have.

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### VI. RELEVANT MARKETS

2 129. RealPage has replaced independent decision-making on prices among 3 horizontal competitors with a price-fixing agreement that unreasonably restrains trade. Each Lessor Defendant has agreed to exchange detailed, confidential, proprietary data with 4 5 RealPage and, through RealPage, with the other Lessor Defendants. The Lessor Defendants 6 understood RealPage would use this competitive data to generate prices for Lessor Defendants that were above competitive levels. The Lessor Defendants understood that all 7 8 participants would agree to price their units using RealPage's pricing algorithm. This 9 conduct is *per se* illegal; these acts constitute a single, horizontal conspiracy to control, fix, 10 raise, stabilize, or maintain at artificially high levels the rent charged to multifamily 11 apartment tenants in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas.

12 130. RealPage is not a supplier of housing or a housing builder and does not have
13 a vertical relationship with Lessor Defendants. Instead, RealPage acts as a middleman to
14 facilitate the horizontal exchange of competitive information to control, fix, raise, stabilize,
15 or maintain artificially high rent prices.

16 131. The Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, like the federal Sherman Act, 17 makes it *per se* illegal for competitors to agree on the prices they will charge. When 18 competitors have entered a *per se* illegal horizontal conspiracy, it is no defense for them to 19 claim that they acted with good motives or believed their conduct was lawful or that the 20 conduct may have had some good results. Even if Defendants' conduct here were not given 21 *per se* treatment and instead were analyzed under the rule of reason, the conduct has 22 increased prices, reduced output, and unlawfully restrained competition.

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A.

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### The relevant product market is multifamily apartment leases.

24 132. As Defendant RealPage has observed, the multifamily apartment market is a
25 separate and distinct market from other residential markets. On its website, for example,

RealPage lists "Multifamily" as its own market and distinguishes it from affordable,
 military, senior, single-family, and student housing, as well as commercial properties.

133. Consumers do not consider apartments, condominiums, or houses for
purchase as substitutes for multifamily rental apartment units because, among other reasons,
the purchase of real estate requires the ability to make a substantial down payment and, in
most cases, to obtain financing.

134. Consumers also do not consider single-family real estate rentals as an
economic substitute for multifamily apartments. Single-family properties do not typically
offer the same amenities—such as security or access to public transportation—that
multifamily apartments provide. For that reason, industry participants in multifamily
residential real estate distinguish multifamily residential real estate from single-family
residential real estate in market trend reports and when discussing customer preferences.
Industry participants have observed different pricing for single-family real estate rentals.

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B.

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# The relevant geographic markets are the Phoenix metropolitan area and the Tucson metropolitan area.

16 135. The broadest plausible relevant geographic markets are the Phoenix17 metropolitan area and the Tucson metropolitan area.

18 136. A geographic market can be defined as the region in which the seller operates
and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supply. Although Defendants operate
nationally, housing markets are local. Factors like commuting distance to a place of work
or school pose significant geographic constraints on where a person chooses to live.

- 137. The U.S. Census Bureau and Office of Management and Budget establish a
  Metropolitan Statistical Area ("MSA") for each major metropolitan area in the country,
  including Phoenix and Tucson. The Census Bureau defines an MSA as a geographic entity
  associated with at least one core urbanized area of 50,000 or more people, plus adjacent
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territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured
 by commuting ties.

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### 1. The Phoenix metropolitan area

138. The U.S. Census Bureau defines the Phoenix metropolitan area as including
Maricopa County and Pinal County and refers to this geographic area as the "PhoenixMesa-Chandler MSA." Until 2018, the U.S. Census Bureau previously identified this
metropolitan area as the "Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale MSA."

8 139. There are several cities within the Phoenix metropolitan area, including
9 Phoenix, Mesa, Scottsdale, and Tempe. Nevertheless, RealPage views the Phoenix
10 metropolitan area one single distinct geographic market. For example, RealPage tracks
11 revenue, occupancy, and rent concessions in the Phoenix metropolitan area:

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MARKET LEADERBOARD

### PHOENIX-MESA-SCOTTSDALE, AZ

Phoenix continues to lead the nation for apartment rent growth, as local operators have raised rents in recent months at an annual rate of more than 8%. Driving the rent acceleration, the market has remained essentially full over the past year, even as developers continue to introduce apartments to the leasing pool in historically high numbers. Developers have primarily targeted a handful of upscale neighborhoods with strong demand drivers on the metro's east side. A strong employment base and solid demand volumes have allowed vacancies to lease up well and driven down vacancies in middle and lower-tier product. As the economy looks certain to falter in the near term, apartment performance in Phoenix is expected to slow, but rent growth will likely continue to outpace regional and national norms.

140. Lessor Defendants also view the Phoenix metropolitan area as one distinct
geographic market. For example, Lessor Defendant Greystar advertises "Apartments for
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rent in Phoenix Metro."<sup>59</sup> Defendant BH likewise advertises its apartments in Tempe, Mesa, and Chandler as "Apartments in Phoenix, AZ."60

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141. Renters in the Phoenix metropolitan area are unlikely to consider multifamily residential leases in other MSAs as adequate substitutes for multifamily residential leases 4 5 within the Phoenix metropolitan area. The Phoenix metropolitan area includes two of the 6 largest counties in the state (Maricopa and Pinal). So, leases outside the Phoenix 7 metropolitan area would not be suitable substitutes for leases inside the Phoenix 8 metropolitan area because they would leave renters with impractical commutes to schools 9 or jobs.

10

As a result, multifamily residential real estate outside Maricopa County and 142. 11 Pinal County are not within the relevant Phoenix metropolitan geographic market for 12 antitrust purposes.

143. Because the Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler MSA covers both Maricopa and Pinal 13 Counties, it provides a conservatively broad geographic market definition that likely 14 15 understates Defendants' market power in the Phoenix metropolitan area.

Even within the Phoenix metropolitan area, some renters may be unwilling to 16 144. 17 consider multifamily apartments too far from their workplaces, schools, and families. A 18 renter in downtown Phoenix, for instance, may be hesitant to move to Deer Valley and 19 increase his or her commute by an hour or more.

145. As such, there may be submarkets within the Phoenix metropolitan area. 20 21 RealPage itself has identified at least 31 potential submarkets in the Phoenix metropolitan 22 area and allows Lessor Defendants to sort data from these submarkets separately:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Greystar, *Apartments for Rent in Phoenix Metro*, available at <u>https://www.greystar.</u> com/browse-apartments/us/az/phoenix-metro.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> BH, Apartments in Phoenix, AZ, available at https://livebh.com/apartments-in/phoenix-26 az/.

1	Submarket	Submarket		
2	-Select One-	∽ -Select One- ∽		
3	-Select One- Avondale/Goodyear/West Glend	chandler		
4	Central Phoenix	Deer Valley East Mesa		
5	Chandler Deer Valley	East Phoenix Far West Phoenix		
6	East Mesa East Phoenix	Gilbert North Central Phoenix		
7	Far West Phoenix Gilbert	North Glendale North Scottsdale		
8	6. North Central Phoenix North Glendale	6. North Tempe/University		
	North Scottsdale North Tempe/University	Northeast Phoenix Northwest Mesa		
9	Northeast Phoenix	Northwest Phoenix Peoria/Sun City/Surprise		
10	Northwest Mesa Northwest Phoenix	South Glendale South Phoenix		
11	57 Peoria/Sun City/Surprise South Glendale	\$7 South Proteinx \$7 South Scottsdale		
12	South Phoenix	South Tempe Southwest Mesa		
12	South Scottsdale	West Phoenix		
13				
14	2. The Tucson metropolitat	an area		
15	146. The U.S. Census Bureau defines the Tucson metropolitan area as including			
16	all of Pima County and refers to this geographic area as the "Tucson MSA." It includes			
17	Tucson, Marana, and Oro Valley. RealPage views the Tucson metropolitan area as one			
18	single distinct geographic market. For example, RealPage tracks revenue, occupancy, and			
19	rent concessions in the Tucson metropolitan area:			
20	MARKET LEADERBOARD			
21				
22	TUCSON, AZ			
23		s of overall occupancy and an outperformer in terms of rent		
24	growth in December. The market recorded occupancy of 92.3%, below the U.S. average of 94.1% in December. Occupancy in the market declined -1.14 points year-over-year. The December occupancy rate			
25	trailed the five-year average of 95.4%. As occupancy decreased in past year, same-store rental rates for new leases decreased -10.0. That rent performance exceeded the U.S. average of 0.25%. Over the past			
26	five years, annual rent growth in Tucson, AZ a			
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1	147. Lessor Defendants also view the Tucson metropolitan area as one distinct
2	geographic market. For example, Lessor Defendant Greystar notes that it has apartments
3	available in the "Tucson Metro." <sup>61</sup>
4	148. Renters in the Tucson metropolitan area are unlikely to consider multifamily
5	apartment leases in other MSAs as adequate substitutes for multifamily residential leases
6	within the Tucson metropolitan area. The Tucson metropolitan area includes the entirety of
7	Pima County. Thus, leases outside the Tucson metropolitan area would not be suitable
8	substitutes for leases inside the Tucson metropolitan area, because they would leave renters
9	with impractical commutes to schools or jobs.
10	149. The Tucson metropolitan area is also a conservatively broad geographic
11	market. RealPage itself has identified at least seven potential submarkets that it tracks
12	separately within this region:
13	Submarket
14	
15	-Select One-
16	-Select One- Airport/Drexel Heights/Sahuarita
17	Casas Adobes/Oro Valley Catalina Foothills
18	Central Tucson/University East Central Tucson
10	Southeast Tucson
	West Tucson
20	150. Because broad geographic markets understate Defendants' market power in
21	the relevant geographic markets, the State's estimates for market power are conservative
22	estimates and likely understate the effect that Defendants' conspiracy has within the
	5 1 5

- 24 25
- 26 61 <u>https://www.greystar.com/browse-apartments/us/az</u>.

C.

# Lessor Defendants have market power in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas.

3 151. The Phoenix and Tucson multifamily apartment markets satisfy the market power test historically used by federal antitrust enforcement agencies, widely known as the 4 "SSNIP" test.<sup>62</sup> That test asks whether a hypothetical monopolist or cartel in a posited 5 market could profitably charge prices that are significantly higher than the prices that would 6 prevail if the market were competitive. If a hypothetical monopolist or cartel could do so, 7 then the test is passed, meaning that the posited market is sufficiently broad (*i.e.*, includes 8 9 a sufficient number of substitutes) to be useful in economic analysis. If the test is failed, the posited market is too narrow (i.e., includes an insufficient number of substitutes) to be 10 11 useful in economic analysis. The posited market should then be expanded to include the next closest substitute, and the hypothetical monopolist test should be repeated to see 12 whether the slightly broader market is sufficiently broad. 13

- 14 152. Here, the markets alleged satisfy the SSNIP test. The State's preliminary
  15 regression in the Phoenix metropolitan area shows Lessor Defendants' prices are at least
  16 12% higher than non-participants' prices. The State's preliminary regression in the Tucson
  17 metropolitan area shows Lessor Defendants' prices are at least 13% higher than non18 participants' prices.
- 19 153. This is evidence that Lessor Defendants have been able to raise prices without
  20 driving enough renters out of the market to make the price increase ineffective or
  21 unprofitable. Because landlords can significantly increase prices without losing sufficient

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> On December 18, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice issued new guidance that expands the SSNIP test. The guidance notes that regulators may evaluate whether a product would take at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price ("SSNIP") or other worsening of terms ("SSNIPT"). *See* U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n., Merger Guidelines (Dec. 18, 2023). Because the State's initial regression measures the potential for increases in price, it refers to the "SSNIP" test.
Discovery may uncover that Defendants' conduct also led to worsening terms, as measured by the SSNIPT test.

sales to render the increase unprofitable, the multifamily apartment lease markets in the
 Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas are not too narrowly defined.

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154. Market power can also be shown through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. Lessor Defendants using RealPage's RM Software have touted their ability to raise rents by 20% or more. And similarly, Defendant RealPage publicly advertises that lessors can increase revenue by 3% to 7% regardless of market conditions by using its RM Software.

8 155. In addition to direct evidence of market power, Lessor Defendants' market 9 shares also provide indirect evidence that they collectively exercise market power in the 10 Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. Approximately 70% of multifamily apartment 11 units listed in the Phoenix metropolitan area are owned, operated, or managed by companies 12 that have contracted with RealPage for "Revenue Management." More than 50% of 13 multifamily apartment units listed in the Tucson metropolitan area are owned, operated, or 14 managed by companies that have contracted with RealPage for "Revenue Management."

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### VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

### COUNT I

### VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1401 ET SEQ.)

19 156. The State repeats and re-alleges every preceding allegation of this Complaint20 as if fully set forth herein.

157. Beginning at a time currently unknown to the State, Defendants formed a
cartel to artificially inflate the price of multifamily apartment leases in the Phoenix and
Tucson metropolitan areas. Defendants' acts in furtherance of their combination or
conspiracy were authorized, ordered, or done by their officers, agents, employees, or
representatives while actively engaged in the management of Defendants' affairs.

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158. By entering an agreement providing for the use of RealPage's RM Software and related services, as well as the exchange of sensitive non-public information with competitors through RealPage, Lessor Defendants and Defendant RealPage have entered into contracts, combinations in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce all or any part of which is within Arizona, in violation of the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, A.R.S. § 44-1401 *et seq.* Lessor Defendants have agreed with RealPage to delegate rent price-setting responsibility to RealPage for multifamily apartment units in Arizona, rather than competing with other landlords on the basis of price.

9 159. Additionally, through numerous means of communication, including writings, videos, and in-person meetings, Lessor Defendants have entered with each other 10 11 into horizontal contracts, combinations in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce all or any part of which is within Arizona, in violation of 12 the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, A.R.S. § 44-1401 et seq. Specifically, Lessor 13 14 Defendants have recruited one another into an agreement to exchange sensitive non-public data among competitors and delegate to RealPage price-setting responsibility for 15 16 multifamily apartment units in Arizona, instead of competing with one another on the basis 17 of price.

18 160. By delegating a substantial majority of price-setting authority to a centralized 19 entity, RealPage, Defendants have conspired to reduce the supply of multifamily apartment 20 units in the form of limited target occupancy rates and to fix and increase the price of leases 21 for multifamily housing units in Arizona. Defendants further advanced their anticompetitive 22 scheme by agreeing to share, and in fact sharing, competitively sensitive, non-public 23 information with their competitors, through RealPage.

24 161. Defendants' anticompetitive misconduct is unlawful *per se* under the Arizona
25 Uniform State Antitrust Act. Even if the misconduct were not found to be unlawful *per se*—
26 and it should be—the misconduct is additionally unlawful under the rule of reason. There

1 are no procompetitive justifications sufficient to outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the misconduct. 2

162. The result of Defendants' anticompetitive conspiracy has been to limit competition in the market for leases of multifamily apartment units in Arizona, forcing 4 5 Arizona renters to pay illegal, supra-competitive rents and incur substantial damages.

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163. The State seeks legal and equitable relief as allowed by law, including, *inter* 6 7 alia, disgorgement, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, costs of investigation and prosecution 8 of this action, all appropriate civil penalties and fees, and any other relief to which the State 9 may be entitled.

10 **COUNT II** 11 VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1521 ET SEQ.) 12 **UNFAIR ACTS OR PRACTICES** 13 The State repeats and re-alleges every preceding allegation of this Complaint 164. 14 as if fully set forth herein. 15 165. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act prohibits, among other things, "unfair 16 act[s] or practice[s] in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise." 17 A.R.S. § 44-1522(A). It is the Arizona Legislature's stated intent that courts may use as a 18 guide for interpreting this provision interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission 19 ("FTC") and federal courts to FTC Act Sections 5, 12, and 15. 20 166. Defendants' conduct described throughout this Complaint constitutes unfair 21 acts or practices prohibited by the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act. 22 167. Defendants' violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act were wilful 23 because Defendants knew or should have known that their conduct was of the nature 24 prohibited by A.R.S. § 44-1522. Defendants are "person[s]" within the meaning of, and 25 subject to, the provisions of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1521(6). 26

1	168. The apartment leases described above are "merchandise" under A.R.S. § 44-		
2	1521(5).		
3	169. Defendants' unlawful practices, as described herein, occurred "in connection		
4	with the sale or advertisement" of residential leases. See A.R.S. § 44-1521(1), (7).		
5	170. The State seeks all legal and equitable relief as allowed by law, including,		
6	inter alia, restitution, disgorgement, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs of		
7	investigation and prosecution of this action, all appropriate civil penalties and fees, and any		
8	other relief to which the State may be entitled.		
9	COUNT III		
10	VIOLATIONS OF THE ARIZONA		
11	CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (A.R.S. § 44-1521 ET SEQ.)		
12	MISREPRESENTATION OR CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS		
13	171. The State repeats and re-alleges every preceding allegation of this Complaint		
14	as if fully set forth herein.		
15	172. The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act prohibits, among other things, the "act, use		
16	or employment by any person of any deception, misrepresentation, or concealment,		
17	suppression or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement		
18	of any merchandise." A.R.S. § 44-1522(A).		
19	173. Defendants deceived consumers who wished to rent multifamily housing into		
20	believing that competitors were making individual pricing decisions that were competitive.		
21	In reality, Lessor Defendants have delegated price-setting authority to a centralized entity,		
22	RealPage, to ratchet up prices.		
23	174. In addition to their active deception, RealPage trained Lessor Defendants to		
24	omit material facts from consumers when questioned about these price increases.		
25	Defendants omitted these material facts about pricing to lead them into believing that		
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	-47-		

pricing was competitive with the intent that consumers rely on Defendants' concealment,
 suppression, and omissions.

175. Defendants' violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act were wilful
because Defendants knew or should have known that their conduct was of the nature
prohibited by A.R.S. § 44-1522. Defendants are "person[s]" within the meaning of, and
subject to, the provisions of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1521(6).

7 176. The apartment leases described above are "merchandise" under A.R.S. § 448 1521(5).

9 177. Defendants' unlawful practices, as described herein, occurred "in connection
10 with the sale or advertisement" of residential leases. A.R.S. § 44-1521(1), (7).

178. The State seeks all legal and equitable relief as allowed by law, including, *inter alia*, restitution, disgorgement, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs of
investigation and prosecution of this action, all appropriate civil penalties and fees, and any
other relief to which the State may be entitled.

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### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

16 WHEREFORE, the State of Arizona respectfully requests that this Court enter17 judgment against Defendants and:

18 A. Adjudge and decree that Defendants' actions constitute unreasonable and
19 unlawful restraints of trade in violation of the Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act,
20 A.R.S. § 44-1401 *et seq.*;

B. Adjudge and decree that Defendants' actions are unlawful under the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1521 *et seq.*;

C. Enjoin and restrain Defendants, their affiliates, assignees, subsidiaries, successors, and transferees, and their officers, directors, partners, agents and employees, and all other persons acting or claiming to act on Defendants' behalf or in concert with them, from continuing to engage in any anticompetitive conduct and from adopting in the future any practice, plan, program, or device having a similar purpose or effect to the
 anticompetitive and unfair actions set forth above;

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D. As needed, enter such relief to remove any ability of Defendants to harm competition by the anticompetitive and unfair actions set forth above, including, but not limited to, structural relief as well as effective, monitorable, and measurable conduct remedies that eliminate the ability of Defendants to continue to reap benefits from their pattern of anticompetitive harm;

8 E. Appoint a corporate monitor to ensure implementation of all structural or
9 behavioral remedies ordered by the Court, as well as to ensure that Defendants do not
10 engage in further anticompetitive conduct, at Defendants' expense;

F. Award to the State any other equitable relief as the Court finds appropriate to
redress Defendants' violations of the laws specified above and to restore competitive
conditions in the markets affected by Defendants' unlawful conduct and to deprive
Defendants of any advantages from their unlawful acts;

G. Award to the State the appropriate civil penalties provided by the Arizona
Uniform State Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act for Defendants'
violations of those statutes;

H. Award to the State statutory or equitable disgorgement, restitution, and any
other equitable relief for the benefit of Arizona consumers as appropriate under the Arizona
Uniform State Antitrust Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act;

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I. Award to the State its costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees;

J. Award post-judgment interest on all monetary relief to accrue at the highest
rate permitted by A.R.S. § 44-1201 or other applicable law; and

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Order any additional relief this Court deems just and proper.

The State hereby demands a jury trial on all issues so triable.

-49-

1	Dated: February 28, 2024	Respectfully submitted,
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