1	THOMAS C. HORNE		
2	Attorney General (Firm State Bar No. 14000)		
3	Charles A. Grube, State Bar No. 011511 Senior Agency Counsel		
4	Brian P. Luse, State Bar No. 021194		
5	Assistant Attorney General 1275 West Washington Phoenix Arizone 85007 2026		
6	Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926 Telephone: (602) 542-8341 charles.grube@azag.gov		
7	adminlaw@azag.gov (for court use only) Attorneys for the State ex rel. Thomas C. Ho	rne	
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA		
9	IN MARICOPA COUNTY		
10	WHITE MOUNTAIN HEALTH CENTER, INC., an Arizona non-profit corporation,	No. CV2012- 053585	
11	Plaintiff,	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
12	v.	(Assigned to the Hon. Michael D. Gordon)	
13	COUNTY OF MARICOPA; WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, ESQ., Maricopa County		
14	Attorney, in his official capacity; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH		
15	SERVICES, as agency of the State of		
16	Arizona; WILL HUMBLE, Director of the Arizona Department of Health Services, in		
17	his Official Capacity; and DOES I-X,		
18	Defendants.		
19		I	
20	The State of Arizona ex rel. Thomas C	C. Horne in his official capacity as the Attorney	
21	General, by undersigned counsel, hereby mo	ves this Court pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 for	
2.2.	entry of summary judgment in the form of a	declaration that the relief Plaintiff has sought is	

preempted by the laws of the United States. The grounds for this motion are fully stated in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, but may be briefly summarized as follows.

Possession, distribution and cultivation of marijuana are all forbidden by federal law, and state authorization of these activities is preempted. There is no dispute that the Plaintiff has sought an order of this Court compelling the named Defendants to take certain steps designed to authorize the Plaintiff to open a marijuana dispensary under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. Since the relevant portions of the AMMA directly conflict with federal law, they are preempted and thus of no legal force or effect. Operating the dispensary would violate public policy, as it would be a federal crime. This Court should so declare and enter a judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's claims as preempted by federal law.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

Plaintiff brought this action on or about June 20, 2012 seeking various declaratory and injunctive relief under the "Arizona Medical Marijuana Act," which the Plaintiff refers to as the "AMMA." Plaintiff forthrightly states the ultimate purpose of the action: "Plaintiff desires to own and operate a nonprofit medical marijuana dispensary and cultivation site as defined in the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act. . . . (Compl. \P 2.) Plaintiff's acknowledgement of the goal of the action together with Plaintiff's request for affirmative injunctive relief are the only facts necessary to this summary judgment motion. The remaining material is offered as explanatory background.

The Arizona Medical Marijuana Act

On November 2, 2010, Arizona voters passed the AMMA as an initiative measure, known as "Proposition 203." The purpose of Proposition 203 was "to protect patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physician and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties and property forfeiture if such patients engage in the

medical use of marijuana." Prop. 203, § 2(G) (2010). Under the AMMA, qualifying patients would be able to receive up to 2 ½ ounces of marijuana every two weeks from medical marijuana dispensaries or to cultivate their own plants under certain conditions. Prop 203, § 3;
A.R.S. § 36-2801(1). After its passage, the AMMA was codified as A.R.S. § 36-2801 through -2819.

The AMMA requires the Arizona Department of Health Services ("ADHS") to be responsible for implementing and overseeing the AMMA. Specifically, the AMMA provides for the registration and certification by the ADHS of "nonprofit medical marijuana dispensaries," "nonprofit medical marijuana dispensary agents," "qualifying patients," and "designated caregivers." *Id.* The AMMA requires ADHS to adopt rules governing the registration and certification process within 120 days after the effective date of the AMMA. A.R.S. § 36-2803. Under the Act, the ADHS is required to adopt rules establishing the form and content of applications, the manner in which applications will be considered, the amount of application and renewal fees within certain maximum limits, and rules governing dispensaries. *Id.* As required by the Act, the ADHS promulgated final rules that were filed with the Secretary of State on April 13, 2011. Those rules were codified as Arizona Administrative Code ("A.A.C.") R9-17-101 through -323.

Several AMMA portions purport to immunize persons against legal consequences for actions that violate federal law, or to authorize a person to act in violation of federal law. In particular, A.R.S. § 36-2804.04(A)(7) requires registry identification cards to clearly state "whether the cardholder has been authorized by this chapter to cultivate marijuana plants for the qualifying patient's medical use." *See also* A.R.S. § 36-2801(1)(a)(ii) (stating that "allowable amount of marijuana" includes up to twelve marijuana plants if the "qualifying patient is authorized to cultivate marijuana"). A.R.S. § 36-2806(E) authorizes registered dispensaries to cultivate marijuana, and A.R.S. § 36-2806(F) authorizes dispensaries to acquire marijuana from patients and caregivers. A.R.S. § 36-2811(B) says that a qualifying patient or

registered caregiver "is not subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty in any manner, or denial of 1 any right or privilege," for the possession, providing, offering or use of marijuana pursuant to 2 the AMMA. A.R.S. § 36-2811(E) states that a dispensary is not subject to prosecution, seizure 3 or penalty for acting pursuant to the AMMA in acquiring, possessing, cultivating, 4 manufacturing, delivering, transferring, transporting, supplying, selling or dispensing 5 marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-2811(F) extends the same protections to a registered nonprofit medical 6 marijuana dispensary agent. **State Officials Sought a Formal Attorney General Opinion** 7 On August 6, 2012, as the result of a request by a member of the Legislature and 8 9 10

thirteen of Arizona's fifteen county attorneys, the Attorney General issued a formal Opinion (No. I12-001, R12-008) concluding that the AMMA is preempted in part by federal law. A copy is attached as Exhibit 1. The Attorney General concluded that the provisions of AMMA and related rules that pertain to the issuance of registry identification cards for patients and caregivers are not preempted because they merely serve to identify those individuals for whom the possession or use of marijuana has been decriminalized under State law, and they are therefore not "authorizations" to violate federal law. However, all AMMA provisions and related rules that authorize any cultivating, selling and dispensing of marijuana are preempted by federal law, particularly the CSA.

Two Recent Judicial Decisions Illustrate the Practical Importance of this Issue In the recent past, at least two courts have denied civil relief to private litigants on the ground that the Controlled Substances Act preempts state laws providing for medical marijuana. In Haile v. Todays Health Care II, Case No. CV2011-051310, another branch of this Court dismissed an action to enforce a loan agreement because the loan was for operation of a medical marijuana sales and cultivation center in Colorado, under Colorado's very similar medical marijuana law. The defendant had failed to repay the loan amount as agreed. Though the court found that the defendant had defaulted, the court dismissed the case. The contract

was void because it was for the purpose of growing and selling marijuana, which is a clear violation of the laws of the United States. Thus, the plaintiffs were denied any recovery of the monies they loaned to defendant, even restitution. A copy of the January 18, 2012 minute entry is attached as Exhibit 2.

On August 8, 2012, the District Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado came to the same conclusion in case where the plaintiff's name was redacted but the defendant was Laura Lowden and Blue Sky Care Connection. A full copy of the case report is attached as Exhibit 3. According to the report, the plaintiff was in the business of cultivation and sale of medical marijuana while the defendant was a retail seller of the same. Plaintiff alleged that under a partnership agreement, he delivered \$40,000 worth of medical marijuana to defendant, but the defendant never delivered either cash or other compensation. Finding that federal law preempted the Colorado medical marijuana act, the court held that the contract was void as it was against public policy. As a result the claims were dismissed.

In both instances, private parties who relied on State law to lend money to or conduct medical marijuana businesses suffered considerable financial loss because their contracts were void under the preemptive federal law. One of the purposes of seeking declaratory relief is to prevent Arizona citizens from unknowingly putting themselves and their property at risk, by believing that the AMMA trumps federal law criminalizing the possession, use and distribution of marijuana.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The federal law on marijuana is easily summarized. Under the CSA, marijuana is a Schedule I drug and as a result, "the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being the use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study." *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2204 (2005).

Passage of a State medical marijuana law does not dilute this at all. In *Gonzales v. Raich*, the Supreme Court held that California's medical marijuana law did not prevent federal agents from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act against persons who claimed their cultivation, possession, use and distribution of marijuana was authorized by California law. *Id.* at 7, 14, 29, 125 S.Ct. at 2200, 2204, 2212-13. Indeed, the Supreme Court held that the CSA preempted any state law that was in conflict with the federal law, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. *Id.* at 29, 125 S.Ct at 2212-13.

As shown in the formal opinion, the Attorney General contends that there is an important distinction to be made in this case. State laws that merely decriminalize certain conduct for purposes of State law enforcement are not preempted, but any State law that purports to authorize conduct that either violates federal law or presents an obstacle to the purposes of federal law is preempted. *See, e.g. Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus.*, 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010)(holding that since Oregon's medical marijuana program authorized conduct forbidden by the CSA, it was an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of Congress's goals, and therefore preempted

Since the formation and operation of a medical marijuana dispensary would violate federal law from its very inception, the portions of the AMMA that purport to allow this are preempted by federal law.

The Court Must Deny Any Equitable Relief That Would Frustrate the CSA

Plaintiff has requested that this Court enter injunctions to assist the Plaintiff in opening and operating a marijuana dispensary. (Compl. ¶¶ 38-39.) Under A.R.S. § 12-1801(3), this Court is authorized to issue such mandatory injunctive relief only when the applicant is entitled to it "under the principles of equity." Perhaps the most fundamental equitable principle of all is that equity "will not be applied to frustrate the purpose of the laws or to thwart public policy." 30A C.J.S. Equity § 99 (2012). Plaintiff's goal in this action is to use the Court's assistance to violate the law.

Arizona courts have applied this fundamental concept in many cases. For example, in *Town of Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Downie*, 216 Ariz. 30, 162 P.2d 669 (App. 2007), *rev'd on other grounds* 218 Ariz. 466, 189 P.3d 393 (2008), the defendant was convicted of contracting without a license and ordered to pay restitution to victims of the full amount they paid for his services, in accordance with a statute. *Id.* at 31-32, 162 P.2d at 671-72. Defendant argued that this was inequitable, since the victims kept the benefit of his work as well as a full refund. *Id.* at 34, 162 P.2d at 673. The court reasoned as follows: "[A]though the result may be harsh in this case, it is nonetheless consistent with public policy. . . . We will not act in equity in disregard of such policy merely to accommodate someone who has violated Arizona's statutory provisions." *Id.* The Plaintiff in this case invokes the Court's aid to violate federal law rather than State statutes, but the equitable principle is the same.

Another example is *Canty v. Canty*, 178 Ariz. 443, 874 P.2d 1000 (App. 1994), where a litigant invited the court to apply equitable estoppel principles to prevent the other party from denying a modification agreement in a child custody case. *Id.* at 447-48, 874 P.2d at 1004-05. The party thus asked the court to ignore an applicable statute, A.R.S. § 25-332, which required a trial court to review any proposed modifications to confirm that they were in the best interests of the children. *Id.* The court refused to do so, reasoning as follows: "Equity cannot apply to invalidate the public policy behind this requirement of trial court review." *Id.* at 448, 874 P.2d at 1005. Nor should equity apply in this case to invalidate the express federal public policy that operating a marijuana dispensary is a federal crime.

The same equitable principle underlies the two trial court decisions described above. *Supra* at 4-5. Courts routinely deny their assistance to any party when their underlying contract is void as in violation of public policy. As an additional equitable consideration, the Court should consider the plight of those who might engage in business with a dispensary, only to learn that their contracts cannot be enforced in case of breach. Certainly, it would thwart public policy for a court to assist the operation of a business that can breach contracts at will because it operates in violation of federal statutes.

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Since the Plaintiff cannot operate a dispensary without violating public policy, traditional principles of equity require this Court to decline any injunctions or other aid of Plaintiff's goal.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter summary judgment finding that federal law preempts the AMMA in all respects relevant to this case, and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

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9	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED	this 23rd day of August, 2012.
10		THOMAS C. HORNE Attorney General
11		/s/ Charles A. Grube
12		Charles A. Grube Senior Agency Counsel
13		Attorneys for the State ex rel. Thomas C. Horne
14	This Brief was	
15	electronically filed with the Court and copies transmitted	
16	by regular U.S. Mail and email on this 23rd day of	
17	August, 2012, as follows:	
18	Jeffrey S. Kaufman, Ltd. 5725 North Scottsdale Road, Suite 190	
19	Scottsdale, Arizona 85250	
20	Kevin D. Ray Aubrey Joy Corcoran	
21	Laura T. Flores Office of the Attorney General	
22	Education and Health Section	

1	1275 W. Washington St. Phoenix AZ 85007	
2		
3	Peter Muthig Deputy County Attorney 222 N. Control Avo. Suite 1100	
4	222 N. Central Ave., Suite 1100 Phoenix AZ 85004	
5	I also transmitted courtesy copies to	
6	the above attorneys via electronic transmission this date.	
7	<u>/s/ Charles A. Grube</u>	
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9	2832637	
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