Yavapai College’s Workforce Development and Job Training Authority

To:

Lynne C. Adams, Osborn Maledon, P.A., on behalf of Yavapai College

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-1448(H), this opinion affirms in part, revises in part, and declines to review in part the opinion prepared for Yavapai College (the “College”) regarding the College’s authority to engage in certain housing and other real property development projects in connection with workforce development and job training activities. That opinion is attached as Appendix A.

First, we affirm the opinion’s conclusion that the College has statutory authority to develop real property for housing purposes under some circumstances, on its own or with private, public, or tribal partners. 

Second, we affirm the conclusion that the College has statutory authority to undertake workforce development and job training efforts, which may (but need not) be connected to real property development with partners. 

Third, we affirm the opinion’s framework for analyzing whether the College’s development projects would be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and any related fees. 

Finally, we revise the opinion as discussed below, and we decline to review the opinion’s conclusions as to any specific development project. Any project the College contemplates will involve potential legal and procedural requirements beyond the scope of this opinion.

The College has statutory authority to develop real property for housing, with or without private, public, or tribal partners.

The College is a political subdivision. See A.R.S. § 15-1401(7). Its stated purpose is to “transform[] lives and strengthen[] the local economy through education.” Yavapai College, The College Mission, https://www.yc.edu/v6/office-of-the-president/mission.html. As a “legislative creation[],” the College “possess[es] and exercise[s] only such powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied by or incident to the powers expressly conferred, and those essential to the accomplishment of [the College’s] declared objectives and purposes.” Maricopa Cnty. v. Maricopa Cnty. Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 171 Ariz. 325, 328 (App. 1991); see also Mountainside MAR, LLC v. City of Flagstaff, 253 Ariz. 448, 451 ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

As the opinion prepared for the College correctly notes, several statutory provisions combine to provide the College broad authority in this area. For example, statutes give the College the powers to

• Contract (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(4));
• “Construct, remodel and repair buildings” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(5));
• “Purchase, receive, hold, make and take leases of, sell and convey real or personal property” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(A)(11));
• Lease real property, either as the lessee or the lessor, including entering into lease-purchase agreements for real property, buildings and other improvements to the property (A.R.S. §§ 15-1444(B)(2) and 15-1446);
• “Engage in entrepreneurial and commercial activities” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(13)); and
• “Provide goods and services pursuant to a contract with a political subdivision of the state or a tribal government” (A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(15)).

We generally agree that these provisions permit the College to develop real property, including for the housing purposes contemplated here.[1] We also agree that these provisions permit the College to partner with a private entity, political subdivision, or tribal government to undertake this type of housing development. But, importantly, the College is not permitted to give up policy-making authority to any private entity with which it might contract. See Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I06-004 (Oct. 30, 2006). 

Finally, we make clear that any specific housing development project the College undertakes will involve other legal and procedural requirements beyond the scope of this opinion (e.g., the Gift Clause, Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 7; annual budgeting, under A.R.S. § 15-1461). In attempting to achieve its objectives, we agree that the College has a variety of methods at its disposal. We also agree, generally, that it has the statutory power to reserve developed housing for use by College staff, students, and/or certain other members of the community, or as “attainable housing” offered at below-market rents under some circumstances. See A.R.S. § 15-1444(A)(11) (providing the power to engage in certain real estate transactions for the College’s benefit). However, whether a particular project complies with all applicable legal requirements will depend on its specific facts. We express no opinion on the compliance or permissibility of any particular project.

The College has statutory authority to undertake workforce development and job training efforts, with or without partners, in connection with real property or not.

Similarly, on this front, we agree with the opinion’s conclusion that the College’s workforce development and job training efforts are within its statutory powers. Broadly speaking, those efforts are within its educational/vocational ambit and consistent with its mission to “strengthen[] the local economy.” And more specifically, we agree that the Legislature has authorized the College to engage in “job training” activities and in “[p]artnerships with businesses and educational institutions” for “job training purposes.” A.R.S. § 15-1472(B)(1). Some of the same statutory provisions discussed above also permit the College to contract with private, public, or tribal entities to provide such job training or workforce development benefits. See A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(4), (B)(15). We agree with the opinion’s conclusion that “[t]he plain language of the statutes that delineate the College’s authority indicates that it can enter into contracts with private entities or with other political subdivisions of the state.” Opinion at 7. And setting aside whether it is true that “[t]here is no limitation on the subject matter of such contracts,” id., the statutory grant of authority is undoubtedly broad and flexible in nature. 

Thus, the College has broad authority to conduct workforce development and job training efforts, including in the context of “commercial or entrepreneurial activities,” A.R.S. § 15-1444(B)(13), and in conjunction with the types of real property development contemplated by the opinion. But any project must, of course, comply with all other legal and procedural requirements, many of which are again beyond the scope of this opinion.

The College may be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and fees.

We affirm the opinion’s conclusion that at least some of the College’s contemplated development projects may be exempt from certain local planning and zoning regulations and fees.[2] We also affirm the opinion’s analytical framework on this topic—which relies on Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 150 Ariz. 42, 44 (1986) and its discussion of proprietary versus governmental operations—with one potential clarification: the focus on “predominant purposes” suggested by the opinion (at 9) cannot simply rest on the stated intent of any relevant project. Rather, the analysis must be objective.

* * *

In the absence of specific facts, we decline to review or otherwise offer an opinion on the propriety of any particular development project the College may be considering. Such projects may implicate various areas of the law, including procurement law, tax law, and the Gift Clause. They also may implicate procedural issues like budgeting, governing board approval, and funding sources. We express no opinion on whether the College’s contemplated development projects comply with these legal and procedural requirements, and we decline to review any aspects of the opinion touching on these other issues.

Kris Mayes
Attorney General

[1] At various points, the opinion draws on authority applicable to the K-12 school district system to analogize to the community college district system. There are distinct statutory frameworks that govern each, reflecting different policy considerations. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 15-1105 (school districts’ leasing authority must connect to a lawful purpose, including, among other things, an educational or other civic or governmental purpose in the interest of the community). We take the opportunity to note that, while some policies may be applicable to both contexts, authority applicable to one does not necessarily transfer or apply to the other.

[2] We note that, to the extent the projects include “community college buildings,” they may be exempt from local building code, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 34-461(D) and 34-462. The statute does not define “community college buildings,” but exempts any such buildings from local building code. Still, the statute makes clear that any such projects remain subject to state fire code. See A.R.S. § 34-461(A).